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NOTICE FAILURE AND NOTICE EXTERNALITIES
Peter S. Menell and Michael J. Meurer1
A B S T R A C T
The emergence of intangible resources, such as intellectual property illuminates a pre-
viously unrecognized market failure: what we call a “notice externality.” The incentives
of those claiming intellectual property diverge from the social interest. Inventors and
creators can sometimes benefit from obfuscating the scope of rights and keeping others
in the dark about their intellectual property. This article explores the principal causes of
notice failure in the development of intangible resources and offers a multifaceted
framework for diagnosing, preventing, internalizing, and ameliorating its adverse effects.
1 . I N T R O D U C T I O N
The institution of private property addresses a prime resource allocation con-
cern in market-based economies: appropriability (Even 2009). Property rights
encourage investment in resource development by granting property owners
rights to exclude and develop their resources, which can enhance owners’ ability
to derive value from their investments. The right to exclude encourages farmers
to cultivate crops by ensuring that they, and not interlopers, will be able to reap
the harvest. It also encourages land developers to build homes knowing that
they can prevent squatters from occupying the dwellings. In these ways, the
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rights and institutions of private property promote efficient land resource
development.
In modern real estate markets, notice rarely poses a serious problem for
property development. Land boundaries are typically recorded in government
administered and publicly accessible recording offices. Landowners can usually
determine who their neighbors are, the boundaries of their land, and restric-
tions on land development relatively easily. This enables property owners to
assess the parameters for developing their land and, when they wish to exceed
those parameters, the counterparties with whom they need to bargain for add-
itional rights.2 Problems can arise—such as where prior owners agreed on
boundaries that diverged from those reflected in deeds, circumstances sur-
rounding easements and covenants have changed, and the government restricts
land use—but these complications rarely stand in the way of determining rele-
vant counterparties, and institutions, such as zoning boards and judicial pro-
ceedings to quiet title, can assist parties in planning.
Effective notice is a far greater challenge when the resources in question are
intangible. Such resources can be difficult to navigate because of the amorphous
nature of intangible boundaries, the difficulty in determining whether an in-
tangible resource is already “owned,” and the complex rights associated with
intangibles. Unlike tangible assets, the nonrivalrous nature of intangibles en-
ables many people to possess them simultaneously without interfering with
others’ use of the resource. It can be exceedingly difficult and costly to even
identify “neighboring” intangible property rights owners.
The development of wireless email technology tragically illustrates the prob-
lem of notice failure. Research in Motion (RIM) set out to develop mobile email
devices in 1995. At the time, there were no apparent “neighbors”—i.e., com-
petitors in the marketplace. For technology developers, however, there is an-
other important neighborhood to check: the Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO). That is not an easy task given the millions of issued patents (plots of
intangible real estate). Unlike real estate maps, these records are not organized
geographically. In the mid-1990s, there were no Boolean search tools and it
would have been difficult to identify which classes of technology to check. The
PTO’s classification system was (and remains) outdated and does not deal
well with cutting edge technologies for the simple reason that it is difficult to
“map” intangible terra incognita. Moreover, the PTO database at the time
did not include patent applications, so there might be no way of knowing
about potential neighbors—a particularly significant problem in emergent
2 Where a land use is for public use, the government can invoke the power of eminent domain to
allocate property rights.
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technologies. Furthermore, the proliferation of digital technology patents cre-
ates countless new neighbors, often with fuzzy, multidimensional boundaries.
Had RIM exhaustively searched PTO records in the first half of 1995, the time
that it attracted substantial institutional and venture capital investors, it would
not have found any intangible “neighbors”—i.e., patents covering wireless
email systems. Unfortunately for RIM, a patent would issue to NTP, Inc., in
July 1995 covering “Electronic Mail System with RF [Radio Frequency]
Communications to Mobile Processors and Method of Operation Thereof”
(U.S. Patent No. 5,436,960, July 25, 1995).3 But even if RIM had located the
NTP patent, it would have still been in a bind. Even though patents come with a
presumption of validity, there were good reasons to question the novelty and
nonobviousness of the NTP patent and it would have taken years for courts or
the PTO to provide a definitive ruling.4
RIM’s BlackBerry device and service was introduced in 1999, quickly becom-
ing a market leader. In early 2000, NTP sent a cease and desist letter to RIM.
RIM conducted a review of the patents and determined that the NTP patents
were invalid and not infringed by the BlackBerry. In November 2001, NTP sued
RIM for infringement of several patents growing out of its initial wireless email
patent application in the Eastern District of Virginia, known for its “rocket
docket.” Following trial a year later, the jury found infringement on all asserted
claims and awarded damages of $33 million (Fried 2002). Meanwhile, RIM
requested that the PTO re-exam the patents at issue. In August 2003, Judge
Spencer increased the damage award to $53 million (NTP, Inc. v. Research in
Motion, Ltd., 2003 WL 23100881 (E.D.Va. 2003)).5 Of greater moment, Judge
Spencer ordered injunctive relief that threatened to shut down the BlackBerry
service (id.). The Federal Circuit stayed the injunction pending appeal. In
August 2005, the Federal Circuit affirmed the trial court decision in part, re-
versed in part, and remanded (NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d
1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). On remand, the District Court denied RIM’s motion to
3 The patent application had been filed on May 20, 1991. Several other patents, containing over 2000
claims, would flow from this original filing.
4 RIM discovered a series of manuals published by Telenor, a Norwegian telecommunications com-
pany, between 1986 and 1989 describing a wireless email device. Thomas Campana, the primary
inventor of the NTP patents, traced his invention date to July 1990. NTP would ultimately sue RIM
on eight patents emanating from the 1991 patent. On re-examination initiated by the PTO and RIM,
the PTO would reject over 2200 claims across the eight patents. See In re NTP, Inc., 654 F.3d 1279
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (vacating-in-part, reversing-in-part, and remanding).
5 Judge Spencer also awarded $4.5 million in legal fees and costs.






























stay further proceedings pending re-examination of the patent. In January 2006,
the Supreme Court denied certiorari of the Federal Circuit decision, opening the
way for injunctive relief. With the injunction threat looming, RIM ultimately
settled the case for $612.5 million in March 2006 (Krazit & Broache 2006). The
problems reflected in this case—identifying patent neighbors and ascertaining
patent boundaries—have increasingly plagued the information technology
sector, adding substantially to the costs and risks of technological resource
development (Bessen & Meurer 2008).
Somewhat distinct notice problems arise in the development of expressive
works. While tangible resource boundaries tend to be well-defined and capable
of precise measurement, the scope of copyrighted works and the permissible
extent of fair use can be difficult to ascertain. These problems have become all
the more frequent in the digital age, where technology makes it easy for anyone
to integrate existing works into blogs, mosaic art forms, and mashups.
Furthermore, the lack of formalities in copyright law make it difficult to
locate copyright owners to even negotiate a license. Whereas copyrighted
works—such as a photograph, a sound recording, or an audio–visual clip—
might be readily available, developers can encounter great cost and difficulty in
identifying, locating, and contacting the rights holders of such works. In the
extreme, the work is an “orphan,” thereby presenting the subsequent creator
seeking to incorporate the prior work with a stark choice: omit the work or run
the risk of an owner emerging and facing defense costs, possible injunctive relief
blocking their entire integrated work, and potentially large statutory damages.
As these examples illustrate, developers of technological and expressive works
often must cope with substantial notice problems. In other words, they often
face challenges in determining the “neighbors” with whom they must deal in
developing their projects and the scope of rights affecting their work.
Property scholars have explored various notice problems in general and with
particular focus on intellectual property. Clarissa Long (2004) suggested that
differing information costs explain differences between the patent and copy-
right regimes. Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith (2000, 2001) explained the
efficiency benefits of standardization in property regimes based upon notice
considerations. Building on that work, Henry Smith (2003) has explored how
the language of property can produce informational externalities.6 Michael
Heller’s (1998, 2008) work on the “tragedy of the anti-commons” explored
how fragmentation of property rights across a wide range of resources can
produce gridlock. Molly Van Houweling (2008, 2010) has examined the
6 In particular Smith considers “a speaker who does not face the full costs of the processing by the
audience.”






























distinctive notice problems flowing from fragmentation of copyrighted works
as a result of software and other open content licensing strategies.
We advance this literature by developing a framework for understanding the
range of notice problems and identifying a particular externality associated with
claiming resources—a “notice externality.” Developers of resources—whether
tangible or intangible—ideally seek to know all potential encumbrances in ad-
vance of investing their time and money in a project (cf. Goetz & Scott 1985,
265–72). Just as contracting parties would ideally operate with fully specified
contracts, resource developers would like to know at the outset all contingencies
affecting their choices. Such information includes the boundaries and holders
of neighboring properties as well as the extent to which those rights affect
“neighboring” activities—e.g., nuisance law for nontrespassory activities, copy-
right law’s fair use doctrine, and patent law’s doctrine of equivalents.
Notice information comprises ownership/boundary facts as well as legal
standards governing the scope of property rights. Ownership and boundary
facts are a public good that is jointly produced by private and public action.
Since private actors cannot fully appropriate the value of providing such infor-
mation in many contexts and, more significantly, can benefit from strategically
hiding, obfuscating, and distorting such information, the quality and the quan-
tity of notice information will be suboptimal in many circumstances. The act of
obtaining an intellectual property right imposes costs on others seeking to
develop intangible resources. The proliferation of such rights, as well as the
uncertainty regarding their validity and scope, can impose substantial costs on
other creators, thereby undermining progress—the very purpose undergirding
the granting of patents and copyrights (U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 8). We look to
legal and economic scholarship on externalities to guide our analysis and frame
policy prescriptions.
The NTP–RIM saga suggests that the notice problems caused by the intel-
lectual property system can exceed the benefits of granting intellectual property
rights in the first place. RIM had independently developed wireless email tech-
nology, yet incurred hundreds of millions of dollars in litigation costs and
market risk that could have been avoided if no patents ever issued to NTP. If
the patent system afforded reasonable notice, RIM would have been able to
identify the relevant counterparty at the time that it set out to develop its
wireless email device business. Merely by seeking patent protection for its in-
vention, NTP imposed a notice cost on all potential developers of wireless
communication developers. Although there is nothing inherently wrong with
seeking patent protection—in fact, public policy encourages inventors to do
so—NTP did not bear the full notice cost it imposed on countless others. This
cost is exacerbated by several patent system features, notably the application






























secrecy rule,7 the difficulty of navigating patent records that are available, and
the ambiguous boundaries and doubtful validity of many patents.
Although notice externalities arise most prominently in the context of
intangible resources, they are not limited to these fields. All resource sys-
tems in which parties claiming property rights potentially impose costs upon
third parties suffer from this market failure. Viewing this resource problem
through the market failure lens substantially broadens the range of policies
and institutions that can be deployed to improve resource development
planning.
Not all notice failures result from notice externalities. Notice failure can
result from inherent ambiguities in the scope of property rights as well as
distorted resource claiming incentives. Our policy framework extends to the
full range of notice failures.
By establishing property-type rights and providing the principal institutions
for recording and enforcing such rights, government plays a central role in the
provision of notice. Yet, private actors play a comparably important role.
Private parties bear responsibility for the information about new resources—
how clearly they are described and justified. They can also take private action,
such as marking their claims, to inform others of their rights.
Private parties’ incentives to undertake these efforts, however, are not neces-
sarily aligned with the social interest. Private parties tend to under-provide
public goods because they do not appropriate the full value of their investments.
In particular, they do not obtain the positive externalities that they bestow on
others. The government as well as private actors play a variety of roles produ-
cing and disseminating notice information. In intellectual property law, stan-
dard setting organizations and industry-wide cross-licensing agreements have
emerged in part to address problems of notice failure.
This article articulates the source and characteristics of notice failure and the
distinctive pathology of notice externalities. Part I characterizes notice failure
and notice externalities and explains how they differ from other important
resource problems, such as resource fragmentation, in resource development.
Part II breaks out the range of factors influencing the quantity, quality, and
accessibility of notice information. It explains why notice failure is more severe
for many intangible resources and why efficacious tangible property notice rules
7 At the time that NTP filed its patent application, the Patent Act provided that applications would be
not available to the public until and unless the patent issued. See 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1994). Under the
American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501A, applications filed
on or after November 29, 2000 are published 18 months after filing unless the applicant pursues
protection only in the USA, in which case the applicant can maintain the application in secret until
the patent is granted (35 U.S.C. § 122 (2012)).






























and institutions do not readily carryover to intangible property contexts.
Part III develops a framework for preventing, internalizing, and ameliorating
notice failure and offers a range of policy recommendations.
2 . N O T I C E F A I L U R E A N D T H E T H E O R Y O F N O T I C E
E X T E R N A L I T I E S
This section first characterizes notice failure and defines “notice externality” by
reference to conventional externalities and in contradistinction to other sources
of information costs, such as fragmentation and lack of standardization. Section
B presents a typology of notice costs. Section C describes the perverse incentives
that underlie notice externalities.
2.1 Distinguishing Sources of Notice Failure
When a land or factory developer sets out to build a structure, or a business
considers introducing a new product into the marketplace, they would ideally
know the full range of potential impediments to their projects. The land devel-
oper does not want to encroach her neighbor’s land. The factory developer does
not want to cause a nuisance. And the product developer does not want to
infringe any patents. Each of these actors will likely retain a resource specialist
(e.g., land surveyor, land use consultant, environmental lawyer, patent advisor)
to determine whether the proposed project invades or infringes the rights of
others. They would like to know, to the extent feasible, the rights of others
before sinking their investment.
But like the contract theorist’s fully specified contract, the economist’s world
of costless transactions, and the physicist’s vacuum, full knowledge of all po-
tential constraints on resource development might not be achievable in the real
world. Neither property law nor property deeds can fully specify the scope of all
potential nontrespassory invasions (nuisances). Nor can copyright law or copy-
right registrations fully delineate all potential fair uses of the protected work.
Yet, this idealized hypothetical baseline provides a valuable construct for as-
sessing the sources of notice failures and a goal for policy intervention.
We can usefully divide the range of notice issues into two buckets: (i) “deed”
information—factual information relating to the actual resource boundaries
and the identity of the owner(s); and (ii) scope of property rights—information
relating to the legal scope of the rights pertaining to the particular resource
claim (such as nuisance, fair use, etc.). The first bucket comports with a more
conventional definition of notice information. Yet, as suggested above, the
resource developer cares about both buckets. Therefore, it makes sense for us






























to use a definition of notice information that encompasses the functional needs
of resource developers.
Notice externalities arise primarily from the “deed” or resource claiming
bucket, but can be exacerbated by ambiguities attributable to the second bucket.
The familiar pollution externality provides a good starting point and analogy
for motivating notice externalities. A pollution externality arises, for example,
when a factory discharges a pollutant that harms a neighboring farm. More
generally, an externality arises whenever a decision-maker chooses an action
without regard to the full impact of that action on some other party or parties.
Under standard economic assumptions, a factory chooses a level of discharge
that maximizes its profits. Absent coercion, such a factory would not consider
(read “internalize” in economic parlance) the cost that its pollution imposed
on the farm. The pollution cost to the neighbor is called a negative externality. If
the factory does not have to pay (or otherwise internalize) the pollution cost
borne by the neighbor, then a profit-maximizing factory will discharge too
much pollution when compared to the social optimum.
If the factory and the farm are merged into a single enterprise, then the full
cost of the pollution would be internalized and the combined firm would
choose the optimal level of discharge. A contract between the farmer and the
factory owner can also achieve optimal pollution levels. If the farm possesses the
entitlement to be free from pollution, then under the Coasean assumption of
efficient contracting, the factory would purchase permission from the farm to
discharge the optimal level of pollution. Likewise, if the factory enjoys an en-
titlement to pollute, then efficient contracting would lead the farm to negotiate
with the factory to discharge the optimal level of pollution. Of course, efficient
contracting faces many obstacles caused by private information, strategic be-
havior, cognitive limitations, and other factors (Menell & Stewart 1994, 57–63).
Absent a merger or contract, pollution costs can also be internalized through
government regulation, emission fees, or tradeable pollution rights.
Both private bargaining and government regulatory strategies for internaliz-
ing externalities can be effective, but they are both prone to error and subject to
information costs. Ideally, property law should be crafted and property rights
assigned to encourage private responses that internalize pollution externalities.
When efficient private ordering is unlikely and pollution harms are significant,
government intervention is needed to allocate resources efficiently.
The notice externality runs roughly parallel to the pollution externality story.
A notice externality arises when the private returns to providing notice infor-
mation are less than the social value. This can happen because providing notice
can be costly, but also because resource owners sometimes benefit when a third-
party trespasses on or infringes her rights. As the NTP–RIM example high-
lighted, NTP was in a stronger bargaining position after RIM had unwittingly






























invested heavily in a potentially infringing wireless email technology. Had RIM
been aware of this potential encumbrance before investing, it would have had
greater flexibility to negotiate a deal, develop a noninfringing alternative, or
pursue other investment opportunities. NTP clearly benefited from its patents
not being easily known. Thus, some resource claimants may prefer to obscure
the existence, scope, or ownership of their property rights. These choices can
impose costs on third parties for which the resource owner is not accountable.
This is not to say that resource claimants will always choose to hide, obscure,
or degrade notice information. Good notice sets the stage for timely purchase of
necessary property rights or avoidance of those rights. Notice information has
value to resource developers who seek to attract capital and acquirers. It is also
valuable to those developers who seek to discourage squatters, interlopers, and
infringers. Notice information is a public good and hence can manifest the
familiar collective action pathology. But private action and coordinated
action (such as in the form of collective rights organizations) can produce
viable solutions under appropriate circumstances.
Uncertainty about the scope of legal rights also produces a notice problem
(Bessen 2009). Even where a developer knows the ownership and boundaries of
neighboring parcels, she might still be uncertain about how high she can build a
structure, how much pollution her factory can emit, or how loud musicians can
perform. Zoning, pollution regulations, and nuisance law govern these activ-
ities. The developer would like to be able to know these land use boundaries in
assessing development choices. Similarly, a collage artist or documentary film-
maker would ideally like to know the boundaries of the fair use doctrine in
developing new projects (Menell & Depoorter 2012). Likewise, technology de-
velopers would like to be able to gauge not just the literal boundaries of “neigh-
boring” patents but also the reach of the doctrine of equivalents.
The next section explores the range of notice costs. Section C discusses in-
centives to generate or degrade notice information.
2.2 Notice Failure Costs
Much like the factory imposes pollution costs on neighboring farms, a resource
claimant imposes notice costs on potential resource developers. Any system of
private ownership or exclusive rights—such as land, patents, or copyrights—
entails title, due diligence, marking, and related costs.
In general, inadequate resource notice imposes four types of costs on other
resource developers:8 (i) costs of determining owners of potentially conflicting
8 In a similar vein, Long (2004) identifies three types of parties adversely affected by notice costs:
avoiders, transactors, and builders.






























property rights; (ii) costs of ascertaining boundaries of those properties;
(iii) costs of assessing the scope of those property rights; and (iv) dispute
resolution costs. Inadequate notice poses a risk of trespass or infringement
upon other resource developers. Inefficient notice regimes raise development
costs and generate wasteful litigation.
In many contexts, these costs are quite manageable because the number and
complexity of “nearby” property rights are small, and thus the cost of evaluat-
ing relevant property rights is a small fraction of the value of the development
project. Notice costs rise as the number of “neighbors” grows, as it becomes
more difficult to identify relevant counterparties, and as the rights become
more difficult to evaluate. Notably, notice costs also tend to rise with the
value of the development project because the returns to enforcement of prop-
erty rights tend to grow with value. Bad projects usually will not attract
enforcement, whereas good projects usually will. The familiar Hollywood
quip—“where there’s a hit, there’s a Writ”—reflects this dispute selection phe-
nomenon. Blockbusters attract more lawsuits than box office flops.
The NTP–RIM story reflects a particularly pathological notice failure. It is
not entirely clear whether NTP behaved strategically, but there is little question
that the patent system’s notice rules hampered RIM’s development plans and
produced tremendous unnecessary legal wrangling. In another modern
Dickensian drama, Rambus hid most of its pending patent applications (and
ongoing efforts to expand its patent claims) from an industry standard setting
body in which it was participating presumably in the hopes that the organiza-
tion would adopt a standard that infringed its patents (Rambus Inc. v. Fed.
Trade Comm’n, 522 F.3d 456, (D.C. Cir. 2008); Hovenkamp 2011, 230–233).
Documentary filmmakers can bear substantial notice costs. After extraordin-
ary filmmaking and rights clearance effort, Henry Hampton produced the land-
mark 14-part documentary Eyes on the Prize: America’s Civil Rights Years/Bridge
to Freedom 1965, which debuted on PBS in 1987. Stanford History Professor
Clayton Carson and editor of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.’s papers praised the
documentary as “the principal film account of the most important social justice
movement of the 20th century” (Dean 2005). The film contained hundreds of
copyrighted works—photographs, music, and film clips—for which clearance
was painstakingly obtained. Unfortunately, many of the permissions expired in
1987 and Hampton did not have the foresight to obtain rights to exploit the
underlying works in the yet-to-be-developed DVD format. As a result, access to
the documentary was substantially limited for nearly two decades (Brown &
Harris 2005; Heller 2008). After expenditure of approximately one million
dollars and nearly two decades of detective and negotiation work, sufficient
rights were cleared (or material replaced) to re-release Eyes on the Prize in DVD
format in 2006 (Dean 2005).






























In many cases of notice failure, the resource developer knows the property
owner, but attempts to avoid infringement rather than bargain for permission.
When the scope of the rights is ambiguous, such a strategy can prove costly. The
following case studies drawn from intellectual property law illustrate the risk:
. In 1998, Nickelodeon Television Network approached snack product
manufacturer Nabisco about developing a new line of crackers based on
its hit children’s series CatDog, which features a two-headed creature that
is half cat and half dog. Pursuant to the Joint Promotion Agreement,
Nabisco marketed a mix of cheddar cheese flavored crackers in three
shapes: half of the crackers were modeled after the CatDog character,
one-quarter were shaped like bones (for the dog half of CatDog), and
one-quarter were shaped like a fish (the cat half’s favorite). Pepperidge
Farms, the owner of a registered trademark on the shape of goldfish crack-
ers, sued Nabisco on the ground that one-quarter of the crackers in their
mix infringed and diluted the goldfish trade dress (Nabisco, Inc. v. PF
Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208 (2nd Cir. 1999)). After finding that the
CatDog goldfish cracker likely diluted Pepperidge Farm’s trademark, the
court granted a preliminary injunction blocking Nabisco from distributing
the cracker mix.
. In the mid-1970s, Kodak, the leading photography company, decided to
enter the instant camera market that Polaroid had long dominated
(Photography: Instant Battle 1976). In order to avoid infringing
Polaroid’s patent portfolio, Kodak hired a top patent lawyer to work closely
with Kodak’s technical staff as they developed what they believed would be
a noninfringing competing camera. The patent lawyer gave frequent advice
about design choices intended to avoid infringing Polaroid’s patents.
Nevertheless, when Kodak launched its new camera, Polaroid sued for
patent infringement and won (Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 789
F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). It was little solace to Kodak when the district
court judge praised Kodak for taking such care to avoid infringement
(Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 1990 WL 324105, *76-*79
(D.Mass. 1990)).9
. In the late 1980s, Borland Corporation developed an improved spread-
sheet program (Menell 1998). Many customers in the marketplace, how-
ever, had already made substantial investments in developing customized
9 Judge Mazzone noted that “[d]uring the lengthy and detailed patent clearance process he performed
for Kodak, Mr. Carr considered over 250 Polaroid and non-Polaroid patents and rendered 67
written and countless oral opinions on both the film and camera patents.” He concluded that the
record “shows a patent clearance process that could serve as a model for what the law requires.”






























macros—specialized sequences of spreadsheet commands—keyed to the
Lotus 1-2-3 menu command hierarchy. In an effort to provide a bridge for
those customers to Borland’s Quattro Pro spreadsheet, Borland program-
mers carefully developed code to enable Lotus macros to operate within
Borland’s product. Borland employed procedures to ensure that no Lotus
code was copied. Nonetheless, Lotus sued alleging that Borland had
infringed copyright in its menu command hierarchy. Lotus prevailed at
the district court, but the First Circuit reversed (Lotus Development Corp. v.
Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), aff’d by an equally divided
Court, 526 U.S. 233 (1996)). During the years that this litigation distracted
both Lotus and Borland, Microsoft’s Excel product gained substantial
ground and became the market leader.
In these three cases, Nabisco, Kodak, and Borland sought to design compet-
ing products without violating rivals’ intellectual property rights. Nabisco and
Kodak lost. Borland ultimately prevailed in court, although the litigation likely
contributed to its (and Lotus’s) marketplace decline. These sorts of gambles
arise because the scope of intellectual property rights is uncertain, negotiating
with competitors can be particularly difficult in the shadow of such uncertainty,
and intellectual property systems lack good preclearance institutions.
Competitors cannot typically obtain definitive rulings on the precise location
of boundaries and the scope of rights. The litigation costs represent a direct
social loss, but the greater social cost may come from the chilling effect of
property rights with fuzzy boundaries. A land owner should be able to plant
crops up to a neighbor’s property line. Likewise, firms should be able to com-
pete vigorously by approaching intangible property lines. The scope of rights
should not be effectively expanded because of the fear of litigation.
Now that we have delineated various notice costs, it is useful to distinguish
other sorts of bargaining and informational costs associated with private prop-
erty systems. The tragedy of the anticommons involves notice costs, but does
not necessarily reflect a notice externality. An anticommons problem can arise
when the existence, scope, and ownership of relevant property rights are known
to everyone. The social harm flows from the costs of negotiating the best
resource use involving highly fragmented resources. As Michael Heller has
cataloged, numerous veto threats cause delay or abandonment of desirable
projects, or cause the price of inputs to soar above the monopoly price because
of the perverse nature of oligopoly pricing of complements. Eyes on the Prize
shows that the cost of locating copyright owners can be very great. But after the
owners have been located, the hold-out problem remains—permission from
nearly every copyright owner was required to exploit the series on the DVD
format.






























Notice externalities are also not simply a problem caused by uncertainty.
Notice failure impedes early bargaining between property owners and resource
developers because potential counterparties often cannot find each other until
after a dispute arises. When developers can identify relevant counterparties
before sinking large investments, the opportunity exists to negotiate in advance
and to take steps to mitigate hold-up problems (Williamson 1979, 1985).
We also distinguish notice externalities from the costs of dealing with
nonstandard property forms examined by Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith
(2000): “The existence of unusual property rights increases the cost of process-
ing information about all property rights. Those creating or transferring idio-
syncratic property rights cannot always be expected to take these increases in
measurement costs fully into account, making them a true externality.”
Although related to notice externalities in that standardized forms can reduce
the costs of communication, the Merrill and Smith standardization externality
derives principally from distinct economic phenomena (Hemenway 1975; Katz
& Shapiro 1985; Menell 1987; Lemley & McGowan 1998). The notice externality
concept illuminates a deeper pathology.
2.3 Notice Provision Incentives
At first blush, one might think that resource claimants would prefer clear
boundaries and accessible notice information.10 This instinct can be correct
for several reasons. First, claimants will want to secure their property and will
therefore seek to comply with applicable legal requirements. For example,
claimants will specify land boundaries using the Public Land Survey System,
write claim language in a patent application, or include drawings in a design
patent application. Second, claimants prefer to invest in boundary information
when that will increase the value of their resources—e.g., through sale, finan-
cing, collaboration with other developers, rental, or licensing. Land developers
are likely to find that subdivisions with clear boundaries and covenants will
maximize the sale price of the land parcels contained in the development. In
addition, the developer may feel competitive pressure to make efficient invest-
ments in notice (Smith 2003). Third, resource claimants sometimes produce
boundary information as a byproduct of the efforts to deter trespass or infringe-
ment via self-help measures, like fences, locks, and encryption. When these
positive motivations predominate, notice externalities will not manifest or
will be relatively inconsequential.
10 Of course, even if an owner prefers clear boundaries, it will only produce notice information up to
the point when the marginal cost equals the marginal benefit of such information. Furthermore, it is
possible that government production of such information will “crowd out” private production of
the information.






























In other settings, resource claimants can gain strategic advantages from
obfuscating their property interest and identity. Gary Libecap and Dean
Lueck note that under metes and bounds land systems—which affords greater
leeway in the specification of boundaries than formal marked boundaries or
rectangular survey systems—settlers had at least two incentives to leave bound-
aries vague and flexible: (i) “in a wilderness it was costly to locate precise
boundaries during the initial land claim, and hence difficult for the surveyor
who followed to find those boundary markers”; and (ii) “given the lack of
information about the location of the most desirable lands at the time of the
initial land entry, claimants did not want to be bound to absolute markers”
(Libecap & Lueck 2011a). Along similar lines, a patent applicant gains from
being able to update her claims as competitors introduce new products, thereby
improving the likelihood that the competitor falls within the scope of the
claimed invention.11
In addition, remedies for trespass or infringement, such as injunctive relief, can
provide the resource owner with much greater bargaining leverage after a devel-
oper has already sunk substantial resources into a project or product. The cost of
licensing a copyrighted work for use as a film prop or set design will be relatively
low before the film is shot because the director will have alternative props and
designs available. But after the film has been produced and marketed, the threat
of an injunction on the eve of release places the infringer over a barrel.12
When the price of lodging resource claims is low, claimants have little to lose
and potentially a lot to gain from hoarding rights and lying low. Many of the
rights will prove valueless, but even a small possibility of extracting substantial
value from independent developers who commercialize similar technologies
can justify the up-front claiming investment.13 Nonpracticing entities in the
patent world benefit from the difficulty that the developers face in searching the
millions of patents and patent claims.
11 See Burk and Lemley (2009a) (observing that patentees routinely overclaim in the hope of retro-
spectively claiming ownership over inventions that were not contemplated at the time of patenting);
Chen (2008) (noting that patent drafters use “vague and ambiguous language in order to preserve
sufficient maneuverability for future litigation”). The applicant cannot claim beyond what she
“possessed” as of the filing date (LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 424 F.3d 1336, 1345
(Fed. Cir. 2005); Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). But having a
vague specification could well provide greater flexibility for expanding claim scope through con-
tinuation practice.
12 In Woods v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 62 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), the court granted a
preliminary injunction against the film 12 Monkeys based upon the unauthorized use of a graphic
work for the design of one film set.
13 Gladwell (2008) reports that a prominent nonpracticing entity, Intellectual Ventures, generates
hundreds of patent applications per year via “invention sessions.”






























In some cases, private advantages can flow from hiding ownership and ac-
quisition strategies. The classic pipeline assembly problem illustrates the
hold-out problem that can arise when single parcels having relatively low
value on their own take on enormous leverage when they become essential to
a large project. For that reason, developers legitimately seek to avoid large-scale
property assembly efforts from becoming known. The power of eminent
domain provides a mechanism for addressing this concern when the project
is for public use.
Opportunities to profit from hiding or obfuscating notice information will
depend on the nature of resources, the efficacy of notice institutions, the scope of
resource rights, and the remedies available for trespass and infringement. As the
next section explores, intangible resources are particularly prone to notice failure.
3 . N O T I C E F A I L U R E A N D R E S O U R C E S
This section examines the circumstances in which notice failure is most likely to
manifest. We begin by looking at land notice systems as a baseline for under-
standing notice rules and institutions. Part B then explores the particular notice
challenges posed by intangible resources.
3.1 Land
A land developer typically has little trouble identifying property rights and
property owners who might credibly assert a claim against a proposed project.
The tangible, geographic, and rivalrous characteristics of land, as well as the
precision of land claims and the availability of public recording systems and
related institutions (such as finance and title insurance), provide relatively re-
liable and inexpensive means for verifying potential property conflicts.
Furthermore, there are relatively few abutting neighbors with whom a devel-
oper must negotiate any adjustments.
If we ask a residential landowner about her neighborhood and neighbors, she
might respond something like the following: “We live on a quiet residential
street of quarter acre lots. Martha and Tim Burns live on the north side of our
property, the Sanchez family lives on the south side, the Johnsons live behind
us, and the Cohens live across the street.” And even if she did not know all of
the names, she could easily determine them from county property records. If
she wanted to build a new garage, she would be able to identify all those who
might be affected and hire a surveyor to determine the boundaries reliably.
In contrast, if we were to ask the developer of a new smart phone about their
neighborhood, they would be hard pressed to identify their neighbors or even
the contours of the neighborhood. They would likely be able to identify the
principal competitors in the marketplace, but smart phone technology exists






























within an opaque multidimensional domain covered by several technology
fields. The developer would have to assess a bewildering array of patents to
determine whether it could practice its innovative design.
Inherent characteristics of land make it easy to measure and communicate.
Land surveys are precise and inexpensive when compared to the value of most
land. Signs, fences, and other structures are also available to communicate
boundary and ownership information efficiently.
Public and private institutions have developed over hundreds of years in
conjunction with surveying technology and the law to clarify ownership,
boundaries, and rights. Publicly available records disclose rights holders and
deeds. In addition, title companies have developed their own libraries of land
records to make search and assessment of land rights more efficient.
The seemingly simple notion that land boundaries can be defined with re-
spect to a pre-established grid was first implemented in the USA in the Public
Land Survey System in the western territories shortly after the Revolutionary
War. Before this rectangular grid was established, surveying was relatively ex-
pensive and imprecise. Notice problems on the American frontier were
common and significant. A typical metes and bounds deed might describe
the property as bounded “From the point on the north bank of Muddy
Creek one mile (1.6 km) above the junction of Muddy and Indian Creeks,
north for 400 yards, then northwest to the large standing rock, west to the
large oak tree, south to Muddy Creek, then down the center of the creek to
the starting point (Public Land Survey System http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Public_Land_Survey_System).” Centralized, pre-surveyed land systems involve
substantial up-front costs. Thus, mandating such a system would have delayed
settlement of frontier lands. For these and other reasons, much of the land mass
of the USA was settled through decentralized, metes and bounds allocation
systems, whereby claimants defined property boundaries with nonstandard
methods of measurement and parcel shape. Nonetheless, individuals demar-
cated land claims in rectangular parcels when the land was flat and homoge-
neous (Libecap & Lueck 2011a). They claimed land using metes and bounds
when topography was rugged and quality varied. Using a natural experiment
from 19th century Ohio, Gary Libecap and Dean Lueck (2011b) found large
initial net benefits in land values from the rectangular system that persisted well
into the 20th century. The lack of an overall framework for coordinating land
demarcation, the vagueness of boundaries, and the irregular shapes of parcels
were major contributors to property disputes.14
14 Libecap and Lueck (2011b) found the litigated dispute rate in metes and bounds regions to be nearly
eighteen times the rate for rectangular survey regions in 19th-century Ohio.






























Good notice in land is further aided by the relatively simple structure of real
property law. For example, the ad coelum doctrine affords a landowner control
over all resources within the boundaries of the three-dimensional column
defined by the deed. Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith (2000) emphasize the
value of standardization in property forms and modularity in designating prop-
erty boundaries. Various common law doctrines and statutory rules reduce and
resolve notice problems on the back-end. The adverse possession doctrine and
good faith improver statutes provide mechanisms to resolve disputes over
clouded title (Dwyer & Menell 1998, 76–84, 292–296).
This is not to suggest that notice problems do not arise in modern real
property settings (Heller 2008). The principal problems, however, relate to
assessing permissible uses of land in more densely populated communities.15
Neighbors can object to development projects that negatively affect the value of
their land. Zoning regulates permissible land use. The goal of zoning is to
encourage compatible use of neighboring parcels. Nuisance law also addresses
conflicting land use by granting neighboring land owners protection against
noxious uses of land. These rules introduce some uncertainty into land use
planning.
But even so, notice costs are usually not severe and zoning institutions enable
developers to determine whether a development project passes muster before
the major construction costs are incurred. Furthermore, some uncertainty
about permissible uses is not necessarily an obstacle to early, efficient resolution
of disputes among affected parties. Land developers can typically identify rele-
vant counterparties relatively easily. Uncertainty about liability by itself usually
does not cause bargaining failure. Rather, breakdowns tend to be driven by
private information about a dispute or divergent beliefs about the likely trial
outcomes. Such breakdowns might be related to notice, but are more com-
monly attributable to other factors.
Thus, modern systems of private property rights in land (and most tangibles)
provide good notice because: the inherent characteristics of tangible resources
keep measurement costs low; public and private institutions support efficient
search for information about land rights and land owners; many of the rules
governing tangible resources are relatively clear; and institutions enable devel-
opers to resolve disputes prior to large development expenditures. Hence,
notice externalities do not frequently arise. Rules and institutions enable devel-
opers to obtain good notice relatively quickly and at low cost before large
15 Zoning restrictions and nuisance law significantly constrain landowners’ ability to develop land in
many settings. These regimes typically seek to internalize the costs that development imposes on
third parties—neighbors and the community at large.






























investments are sunk. The next section explains why these salutary qualities do
not necessarily carryover to intangible resources (Menell 2011).
3.2 Intangible Resources
An essential component of developing any project—whether tangible or intan-
gible—is assessing the risks posed from potentially conflicting rights owners.
Such risks impair the primary objectives of the project, run up the costs of
assessing the project, and stand in the way of obtaining financing. The nature of
real property in conjunction with real property rights and institutions minimize
the costs of identifying conflicting rights and rights-holders, ascertaining
boundaries, quieting title, preclearing development, and insuring against prob-
lems that might arise. In most land development contexts, notice problems do
not stand in the way of the project. They represent a modest component of the
overall budget.
In contrast, developers of many intangible resource projects face significant
problems in identifying potentially conflicting rights, ascertaining the bound-
aries of those properties that they can find, locating the owners of potentially
conflicting properties, and assessing the scope of potentially conflicting rights.
Neither the PTO nor the Copyright Office can look up a development tract and
provide the names, addresses, and contours of all “neighboring” property
owners. The courts cannot definitely quiet title among all intangible rights
holders. The developer cannot typically gain predevelopment clearance of any
identified potentially conflicting right short of negotiating a license. Nor can
developers typically obtain insurance against infringement risks. These prob-
lems undermine the matching process that can be critical to resource planning
and development. They implicitly encourage resource claimants to hide and
obfuscate notice information in several important circumstances, producing
notice externalities. As a result, the ratio of notice costs to overall development
cost can be prohibitively high for intangible resource projects.
We compare the notice provided by intangible property systems to the notice
provided by real property systems along three principal dimensions: inherent
characteristics of the resource that influence measurement and search costs; the
effectiveness of institutions for recording, verifying, clearing, and insuring
against property claims; and the complexity and dynamism of rights associated
with the resources. Figure 1 provides a map for navigating the many complicat-
ing factors.
3.2.1 Inherent Resource Characteristics
A simple but important starting point for our comparison is the number of
relevant property rights that need to be considered by a resource developer.






























A parcel in a residential neighborhood typically borders two to eight other
parcels. In contrast, there is no typical number of neighbors bordering an ex-
pressive work, a trademark, or a patented invention. At one extreme, the Google
Books project involves copying millions of books, each of which can embed
many expressive works. Many of them are under copyright, but the copyright
status and the identity of the copyright owners are often unclear. Furthermore,
many books contain embedded licensed copyrighted works, such as photo-
graphs and contributions to collective works. At the other extreme, the
makers of corporate training videos can often be confident that no copyrights
owned by others could be credibly asserted against them. A film can incorporate
dozens of copyrighted works—such as script elements derived from literary
works, embedded film clips, sound clips, sound tracks, and props. There are
Figure 1. Determinants of Notice Externalities.






























over 5000 U.S. trademark registrations of word marks containing the word
“united.”16 A laptop computer incorporates hundreds of components, each
of which may itself read on numerous patents (Phelps & Kline 2009).
After locating neighbors, land developers can learn about boundaries, own-
ership, and squatters by physically inspecting the parcel. The location of walls,
structures, and landmarks can be directly observed. By contrast, intangibles—as
nonrivalrous resources—can be used simultaneously by different users and
therefore inspection does not conclusively resolve ownership. Therefore,
search within the marketplace might not offer sufficient notice to subsequent
independent creators.
The next critical difference between tangible and intangible resources con-
cerns the existence of standardized measurement systems. Land parcels typically
can be represented on a two-dimensional grid with neighboring properties lying
contiguously. Modern survey technology enables land boundaries to be deter-
mined with scientific precision. These coordinates can be easily recorded within
a publicly accessible database and represented in a systematic geographical in-
formation system.
Unlike land, intangible resources cannot be cataloged in advance. Standard
measuring rods are not available for most intangible resources. Many intangible
neighborhoods have complex, multidimensional boundaries. Software, for ex-
ample, is notoriously amorphous, whereas chemistry has the Periodic Table to
guide cataloging of knowledge. We cannot, for example, simply allocate up to
160 acres per settler, as the Homestead Act authorized to entice development
west of the Mississippi River. A hint of the difficulty in organizing information
about patents comes from analysis of patent classifications. The structure of the
classification changes as new fields emerge.
As a result, intangible resource boundaries are often difficult to codify (Long
2004). The patent system allows patentees to be their own lexicographers, which
contributes the challenge of defining boundaries (Menell, Powers, & Carlson
2010). Judge Zobel invoked Alice in Wonderland in explaining patent claim
construction:
“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said, . . . “it means just what I
choose it to mean—neither more nor less.”
“The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words mean so
many different things.”
16 See U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Trademark Electronic Search System (search conducted on
October 15, 2011) <http://tess2.uspto.gov/bin/gate.exe?f¼tess&state¼4003:5r21hv.1.1>.






























“The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master—
that’s all.” (Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 641 F.Supp. 828, 838
n.8 (D.Mass. 1986), aff’d 789 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
Reflecting the relative imprecision of words in comparison to geophysical meas-
ures, scholars have found a relatively high reversal rate for claim construction
rulings (Anderson & Menell 2012; Moore 2005a) and shown that even experi-
enced patent jurists fare little better than new judges (Schwartz 2008, 2009). The
jurisprudence of claim construction has been roundly criticized for lacking
coherence (Burk & Lemley 2009a; Mullally 2007; Miller 2005; Wagner &
Petherbridge 2004).
Copyright boundaries depend in part on audience reaction to an expressive
work. While copying of the entirety of a copyrighted work typically crosses the
infringement line, it is often difficult to determine the protection of
components or nonliteral elements of a copyrighted work (Merges et al.
2012, 549–52). Similarly, trademark boundaries are tied to whether consumers
are likely to be confused by the use of a word or symbol. Actual consumer
confusion can matter, but ultimately the test depends on multiple factors used
to gauge conjectured consumer reaction. 17
Rights are harder to locate and understand when the uses of property change
over time. The range of possible uses of inventions and expressive works is often
not understood at the time of creation. In his principal telegraphy patent ap-
plication, Samuel F.B. Morse sought to claim all the uses of “the motive power
of the electric or galvanic current, which I call electro-magnetism, however
developed for marking or printing intelligible characters, signs, or letters, at
any distances” (O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 112 (1854) (invali-
dating claim 8). Half a century later, Gugliermo Marconi, the first person to
demonstrate the use of radio waves to communicate messages, envisioned
ship-to-shore communication as the primary use of this technology.
Fortunately for General Electric Corporation (GE), licensee of Marconi’s pa-
tents, the claims supported broadcasting and GE leveraged these rights in its
Radio Corporation of America joint venture to build a vast consumer elec-
tronics and broadcasting empire (Watkins).
17 Boundary definition and verification problems also arise with regard to some tangible resources.
Subsurface mineral rights in the American West often failed to provide clear boundary information
in the second half of the 19th century. Although boundaries around surface mineral claims can be
described using traditional surveying techniques, mineral veins meander below the surface with
occasional discontinuities caused by faulting. Different miners would sometimes tunnel to the same
vein at different sites. Since measurement was difficult and the geology was not well understood,
each miner would claim the vein, and costly and protracted litigation would often follow.































Comprehensive, reliable, publicly accessible, and readily searchable resource
registries form the foundation for an ideal system of notice provision.
County land offices have long provided such services for land resources.
Similar registries exist for public land resource claimants. Although the PTO
and the Copyright Office maintain indices of patents, registered trademarks,
and registered copyrights, they fall well short of the ideal.
As noted earlier, until a decade ago, the PTO did not disclose patent appli-
cations unless and until it granted a patent. Even today, applications remain
secret for 18 months after filing and can be kept secret until patent issuance if
the applicant chooses to pursue patent protection only in the USA. Although
patent damages can only extend back to the time that the public was on notice
of the claimed invention, developers might well be sinking large investments in
technologies that infringe upon inchoate patent rights.
Two significant and related problems for the patent system are the slow speed
and questionable quality of patent examination. Many technology markets
move quickly, yet patent prosecution averages approximately three years
from filing. Furthermore, and of particular relevance to notice quality, the
examination system affords patentees substantial opportunity to revise their
claims during the prosecution period through continuation practice (Lemley &
Moore 2004). Of perhaps greatest significance, the PTO has a high rate of false
positives (invalid patent grants) (Allison & Lemley 1998; Lemley & Sampat
2008) and devotes little effort to ensuring the clarity and scope of patent
claims (Bessen & Meurer 2008). Furthermore, the secrecy of patent applications
(for at least 18 months in most cases) and the ex parte nature of examination
limits the prior art considered by the examiner.
Since copyright and trademark registration are voluntary, PTO and
Copyright Office registries fail to provide the public with reliable notice of
claimed works. U.S. copyright works need not be registered unless the owner
seeks to enforce their rights in court. Owners of works of foreign origin never
need to register their works. Although the U.S. copyright law provides various
enticements to register copyrighted works,18 the Copyright Office registry is
notably incomplete (Sprigman 2004; U.S. Copyright Office 2006; cf., Ginsburg
2010). Moreover, copyright owners bear no legal responsibility to update
their ownership information. Furthermore, Copyright Office records can
be costly and difficult to search and cannot provide a guarantee as to the
18 Copyright registration records a copyright claim, secures rights to file an infringement action (for
U.S. works), establishes prima facie validity of copyright, expands remedies, and assists in providing
constructive notice of facts in recorded documents.






























contours of the neighborhood.19 Federal trademark law protects unregis-
tered trademarks (Lanham Act § 43(a); 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)), and hence all
manner of trademarks—from word marks and logos to trade dress (nonfunc-
tional aspects of product shape and packaging)—can be “owned” and yet
difficult to trace.
Private institutions supplement public registries. Title insurers, for example,
have developed more thorough and easily searchable tract indices for land
resources. The supplementation of public intellectual property registries, how-
ever, is spotty. Collective rights organizations, such as ASCAP and the Harry
Fox Agency, have developed independent systems for tracing particular classes
of copyrights (musical composition ownership). The Copyright Clearance
Center provides collective licensing services for corporate and academic users
of copyrighted works. Private search enterprises, such as Thomson Reuters,
offer a wide range of intellectual property clearance services, but at a high
price and without guarantees.
Unlike land institutions—which enable developers to preclear projects
through zoning administrations and quiet title through legal proceedings—
intangible resource regimes do not provide much in the way of advance clear-
ance options. Trademark law provides the most effective mechanism through
the intent to use (ITU) application process (Beebe et al. 2011). In essence, the
developer of a new product or service can vet a mark with the Trademark Office
and obtain a priority date (based on the application date) and preapproval for
inherently distinctive marks. Other users of related marks can participate
through opposition proceedings—a form of pre-grant review. The successful
applicant receives a Notice of Allowance prior to incurring the costs of mar-
keting goods or services under the mark. Upon introducing the mark within the
statutorily designated period, the applicant can file a Statement of Use upon
which the Trademark Office can complete examination and issue a registration
certificate. Upon registration, the applicant receives a constructive priority date
as of the ITU application filing date.
19 See U.S. Copyright Office, Circular 22: How to Investigate the Copyright Status of a Work 3<http://
www.copyright.gov/circs/circ22.pdf> (“The complete absence of any information about a work in
the Office records does not mean that the work is unprotected.”; “The Copyright Office does not
maintain any listings of works by subject or any lists of works that are in the public domain.”;
“Individual works such as stories, poems, articles, or musical compositions that were published as
contributions to a copyrighted periodical or collection are usually not listed separately by title in our
records.”); U.S. Copyright Office, Circular 6: Obtaining Access to and Copies of Copyright Office
Records <http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ06.pdf>. Works registered prior to 1978 can only be
found in the Copyright Public Records Reading Room at the Library of Congress. Works registered
after 1978 are available through an online catalog.






























Neither the patent nor the copyright system provides nearly as effective
preclearance services. The PTO’s re-examination process allows developers to
contest the issuance of patents.20 This process entails substantial risk to the
party seeking review. Unless the patent is invalidated, there will often remain
questions as to whether competing developer’s composition of matter, device,
or process infringes the patent. Given the proliferation of patents covering many
fields, the re-examination process rarely affords assurance of freedom to operate.
Furthermore, the PTO does not provide binding interpretation of claim scope.
Another route developers can sometimes pursue is a declaratory judgment
action in federal court. Such proceedings are costly, time-consuming, and often
expose the developer to countersuit. Furthermore, they cannot be pursued
unless the patentee threatens enforcement. Due to ambiguity over what con-
stitutes a sufficient threat to support jurisdiction over a declaratory relief filing
(and the strategic advantages relating to venue), patentees and alleged infringers
often engage in a complex drama analogous to Kabuki theater. Therefore, the
developer cannot obtain a definitive determination of noninfringement without
enduring a judicial enforcement proceeding, which jeopardizes the developer’s
upfront investment as well as substantial monetary damages and attorney fees.
Standard setting organizations (SSOs) can provide a partial institutional re-
sponse to the preclearance problem in some technology industries (Lemley
2002). In particular industries, such as those developing network technologies,
standard setting bodies promote notice of intellectual property rights, and
reduce ex post holdouts through by-laws requiring disclosure of intellectual
property rights (including inchoate rights) and binding signatories to license
proprietary technologies on fair, reasonable, and nondisciminatory (FRAND)
terms. But given that those terms are not specified ex ante, the cost of FRAND
essential patents can remain uncertain when investments are made and parties
must still incur substantial transaction costs resolving disputes. At a minimum,
however, these arrangements should prevent outright blocking of competing
uses of proprietary technologies by SSO members—i.e., they appear to take
injunctive relief off the table should a dispute arise.
The copyright system fares little better with regard to conventional projects.
Documentary filmmakers face stark choices in using works of uncertain prov-
enance (Menell & Depoorter 2012; Aufderheide & Jaszi 2011; Donaldson 2008).
Even when they can find the owner of a copyrighted work, cumulative cre-
ators—those seeking to build on the works of others—frequently encounter
difficult questions as to whether a use falls within the ambit of the fair use
20 Pursuant to the America Invents Act, challengers can now initiate postgrant review during an 18
month period following patent issuance (35 U.S.C. §§ 321–29). It remains to be seen whether this
procedure will prove effective at weeding out invalid patent grants.






























doctrine. Short of taking a license, there is often no way to be assured that the
use will be legal. Furthermore, the risks of erring can be high—possibly an
injunction or statutory damages. Technology developers also face significant
risks introducing new devices and services that pose the potential for direct or
indirect liability. As with patents, there is no preclearance institution for resol-
ving these uncertainties before substantial investments have been made and
substantial liability exposure risked.
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) introduced two innovative
procedures for balancing technological innovation and copyright protection.
Under the Section 512(c) safe harbor (17 U.S.C. § 512), online service providers
(OSPs) can host works uploaded by others without fear of financial liability or
substantial disruption to their operations if users post infringing works. The
safe harbor provides for a notice and takedown procedure that allows copyright
owners to seek removal of infringing works efficiently. The OSP need merely
follow the statutory procedures for expeditiously removing or blocking access
to the allegedly infringing material. The uploader can serve a counter notifica-
tion stating that she believes in good faith that the material was wrongfully
removed, which the OSP must pass along to the copyright owner who sought
removal. The copyright owner then has 10 working days in which to seek ju-
dicial relief. If she does not do so, the OSP has four working days to restore the
material. This set of responsibilities and procedures has afforded OSPs with
substantial freedom to develop hosting services without fear of crushing liabil-
ity. It also provides copyright owners with relatively efficient means for blocking
dissemination of infringing copies.
The DMCA also provides a regulatory procedure for addressing the scope
of its anticircumvention provisions (17 U.S.C. § 1201). Under Section
1201(a)(1)(C) of the DMCA, the Librarian of Congress has authority to
exempt classes of “noninfringing uses” for 3-year periods (subject to renewal).
The Librarian has gradually expanded the list of exempted uses to include
circumvention of technical protection measures to enable “jailbreaking”21 of
iPhones and “vidding”22 of small portions of video works for educational uses
by college professors and media students, documentary filmmaking, and non-
commercial videos.
Private insurance can mitigate exposure to notice problems. Movie studios,
musicians, and software developers can spread the risk of copyright liability
through errors and omission coverage (Donaldson 2008). Documentary
21 “Jailbreaking” refers to circumvention of technical protection measures on smartphones in order to
allow third-party applications and services.
22 “Vidding” refers to incorporating portions of motion pictures into new works.






























filmmakers have particular difficulty finding affordable liability insurance due to
the challenges of verifying and assessing infringement risks. Due to the limited
availability of insurance, documentary filmmakers can encounter tremendous
difficulty in lining up distributors for their works. These distributors—which
are large, highly capitalized firms—fear exposure for direct and indirect liability.
Software developers can generally obtain insurance against the risk of a trade
secret lawsuit, but have much greater difficulty obtaining comparable coverage
against the risk of patent infringement. The market for insurance against patent
infringement is almost nonexistent, possibly because of the tremendous risk of
nonpracticing entities emerging from the woodwork, the unpredictability of
patent infringement litigation, and the variable costs of patent defense.
3.2.3 Complexity and Dynamism of Property Rights
Private land rights reflect a relatively simple, broad, and absolute conception of
exclusivity. Within the three-dimensional column established by the ad coelum
rule, the landowner holds the rights to exclude, possess, use, reap fruits, destroy,
and transfer, subject to correlative rights of neighbors (Merrill 1985b).23
Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith (2000) explain that property law offers
land owners a limited set of choices about how they can structure real property
rights in order to reduce the costs of third parties to understand the content of
property rights.
Intellectual property rights are more qualified, remedies more complex, and
defenses more numerous than rights, remedies, and defenses in real property
law. As a result, there is greater notice information to communicate and a
greater opportunity for notice failure. Intellectual property rights systems
serve principally as instrumental exceptions to the default background norm
of free competition (Menell & Scotchmer 2007). Patents and copyrights create
temporary, artificial scarcity relating to the use of knowledge for the purpose of
promoting progress in technology and expressive creativity. Trademarks func-
tion primarily to promote integrity of the marketplace by enhancing consumer
decision-making and encouraging firms to supply quality products and services
by protecting means of designating source.
In contrast to the broad, uniform, and intuitive land rights bundle, intellec-
tual property regimes employ far more variegated and limited bundles of rights
(Menell 2007c; Lemley & Shapiro 2005). These more complex rights structures
reflect a range of countervailing legislative and constitutional purposes:
(i) promoting cumulative creativity; (ii) restricting monopoly exploitation;
(iii) avoiding impairment of free expression; (iv) accommodating access by
23 Zoning, nuisance, and takings law operate as the principal limitations on these exclusive rights.






























underserved constituencies; and (v) limiting overreaching by the publishers. As
a result, intellectual property regimes employ numerous doctrines that involve
substantial subjectivity (e.g., copyright’s infringement standard (substantial
similarity of protected expression) and fair use defense, patent law’s doctrine
of equivalents, trademark law’s infringement standard (likelihood of confu-
sion), exemptions, compulsory licenses, inalienability rules, and temporal dur-
ation). In addition, intellectual property law deploys various complex
channeling doctrines (idea/expression dichotomy, useful article doctrine, and
functionality doctrine) to prevent interference among the modes of intellectual
property protection.
For related reasons, intangibles have more complex remedial structures than
traditional property entitlements. Reflecting the near automatic granting of
injunctive relief for trespass on real property, Calabresi and Melamed (1972)
characterized entitlements protected by a “property rule” to require that the
holder consent to any encroachment or other violation: “once the original
entitlement is decided upon, the state does not try to decide its value.” In
contrast, the Supreme Court held in eBay v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388
(2006), that granting of injunctive remedies in intellectual property cases de-
pends on balancing of equitable factors. Monetary relief can be particularly
difficult to determine in intellectual property cases. The Patent Act affords
owners no less than a reasonable royalty. But given the uniqueness of patent
resources, the value of patents can be particularly elusive. Moreover, the Patent
Act allows for damages to be increased by up to a factor of three in exceptional
cases. This places tremendous importance upon whether the infringer acted
“willfully.” This doctrine discourages intangible resource developers from
searching patent records.
Due to the valuation difficulties and concerns about underenforcement, the
Copyright Act allows copyright owners to elect statutory damages within a wide
band. The Supreme Court has placed discretion to set statutory damages within
the jury’s hands, further complicating the valuation determination.
The nearly schizophrenic commitment of patent and copyright law to broad
access and diffusion of information as well as strong rights to exclude has
further complicated the law in these areas. Antitrust law, misuse doctrines,
and preemption doctrines have been deployed against patent and copyright
owners to promote competition. Particular problems arise in leveraging intel-
lectual property rights into related markets (e.g., Microsoft’s integration of
web-browsing technology into its operating system), the development of stand-
ards (e.g., efforts by companies to influence industry-wide standards without
disclosing their patent applications), and licensing of intellectual property
rights (e.g., restrictions on use of licensed products). Antitrust and fair use
limitations can create additional uncertainty in determining the effective






























scope and enforceability of intellectual property rights, further clouding the
intangible resource boundaries and who may exercise power under these rights.
The interplay of federal intellectual property law and contract law is espe-
cially murky. Under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, federal law
overrides conflicting state law. Even where federal law does not expressly pre-
empt state law, courts will refuse to enforce state law (including contracts that
would otherwise be enforceable as a matter of state law) where federal law
“occupies” the field or where state law “stands as an obstacle to the accom-
plishments of the full purposes and objectives of Congress” (Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67–68 (1941)). The preemptive scope of federal intel-
lectual property law is notoriously vague and subject to conflicting jurispru-
dence. It is unclear, for example, the extent to which intellectual property
owners can override the operation of patent law’s exhaustion doctrine or copy-
right’s fair use doctrine or first sale doctrine through contractual restrictions.
The final set of factors influencing notice concern the dynamic and collab-
orative nature of expressive creativity and technological innovation.
Landowners rarely if ever need to take notice of entirely new additions to the
stock of resources. Furthermore, new accretions do not tend to influence the
use and enjoyment of existing land parcels. In contrast, advancing technology
creates an inexhaustible and constantly expanding frontier. Technology com-
panies must live in this intangible wilderness and hence are continually affected
by the accretion of rights. Even in the copyright realm, new forms of artistic
creativity—such as remixes—often operate in the vast gray area created by
copyright law’s balancing standards.
The mingling of public domain material with the contributions of an intel-
lectual property creator further complicates the notice challenge. Whereas even
the slightest incursion across a land boundary will ordinarily violate the owner’s
rights, many components of copyrighted works are freely available for use by
others. Patents are limited to the particular claimed combination of elements,
not the elements themselves. Furthermore, patents cannot wall-off unpatented
prior art. Similarly, the words of a novel and the colors in a painting are gen-
erally free for others to use.24 Copyright inheres in original selection and ar-
rangement of elements. Trademark law offers protection to Miller Lite for the
beer made by Miller Brewing Company, but Miller cannot block other beer
makers from using the term “Lite” in their trademarks or to describe their beer.
24 Note, however, that colors can be protected by trademark law (Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co.,
514 U.S. 159 (1995)), although this form of protection prohibits only the use of the color in ways
that create a likelihood of confusion and are not functional. Thus, although Owens Corning controls
the use of the color pink in insulation products (In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116
(Fed. Cir. 1985)), others are free to use the color pink for other purposes.






























Thus, while land rights can be analogized to a cleanly cut block of cheddar
cheese, many intangible resources are more analogous to an uneven slice of
Swiss cheese. The fuzziness of the boundaries as well as the lack of protection for
fermentation holes complicate the provision of notice and expand the potential
for opportunistic behavior.
4 . N O T I C E P O L I C Y F R A M E W O R K
With this background in place, we are prepared to analyze policy responses to
address notice externalities.25 In order to focus on notice failure, we assume that
the marketplace will efficiently develop resources if private parties have easy
access to reliable information about potential impediments to pursuing their
development projects. If they can determine the owners and contours of po-
tentially conflicting rights in advance of significant investments, then they will
be able to make efficient decisions. Thus, we are assuming away transaction
costs that might manifest after identification of conflicting property owners and
determination of boundaries and rights.
We divide our framework into three principal categories. We begin with
notice infrastructure. Section 1 examines how the rules and institutions gov-
erning direct provision of notice information can be improved to enhance
resource notice. As noted previously, resource notice is a jointly produced
public good. The government provides the foundational legal infrastructure
for establishing and enforcing resource rights. The market operates on top of
these rules and institutions. Private parties acquire, buy, sell, divide, and de-
velop such rights through private transactions. The interaction of the state and
private parties produces resource rights and notice of their existence, contours,
and extent. Thus, the government is uniquely situated to establish the authori-
tative registry of resource claims.26 If infrastructure is adequate to prevent
notice failure, as is typical in the real property context, then notice externalities
do not arise. But for the reasons explored in Part II, it is unlikely that notice
externalities for intangible resources can be handled entirely through registries.
Drawing upon the toolbox for addressing other forms of externalities, Section 2
explores notice cost internalization policies. We explain how prices and penal-
ties can be used to reshape the potentially distorted incentives of resource
owners to overclaim, confusingly claim, obscure, and opportunistically assert
25 Drawing in part on earlier presentations of this article, the Federal Trade Commission (2011)
identified notice as a critical policy lever for improving the functioning of the patent system.
26 This is not to suggest that private registries cannot augment public registries. Title insurers, for
example, have developed tract indices that are more easily searchable than publicly accessible
grantor–grantee indices.






























resource rights. Section 3 presents a third set of policies that mitigate the ad-
verse effects of notice failure on resource developers. Various aspects of the
design of resource rights and remedies reduce the risks and costs of developing
resources in an imperfect notice environment. Section 4 discusses the interplay
among these three policy approaches and offers two innovative policy proposals
to illustrate complementarities among policy tools.
4.1 Direct Provision of Notice Information
The most direct means of addressing notice externalities is for the government
to provide a comprehensive, transparent, easily searchable index of all re-
sources, resource owners, and means for contacting resource owners as well
as institutions for efficiently clarifying the scope of rights. As noted earlier, the
government provides these services relatively effectively in the case of real estate.
County land offices record property ownership (and encumbrances) increas-
ingly on a tract-by-tract basis. These indices are up-to-date and publicly avail-
able. Various property doctrines encourage parties to record possessory,
nonpossessory, and financing interests associated with the land. To the extent
that parties are unable to determine title, they can bring quiet title actions in
state courts. Zoning ordinances set forth categorical rules for land use. Parties
can seek variances from such rules, enabling them to preclear their development
projects before investments are expended.
These rules and institutions have worked well for avoiding notice problems
in real estate development and their lessons can usefully be extrapolated to
intangible resources. We can usefully boil these rules and institutions down
to six notice-promoting elements: (i) a publicly accessible registration system;
(ii) full, clear disclosure by claimants; (iii) reliable and prompt examination of
resource claims; (iv) transparent notice information and registry search tools;
(v) clear and efficient marking of claimed resources; and (vi) institutions for
resolving boundary disputes, preferably before significant investments have
been made.
4.1.1 Public Registry
In the ideal model, which is approached by land registry systems, the govern-
ment (or a duly designated government-authorized institution) provides a
comprehensive, up-to-date, authoritative, publicly accessible registry that en-
ables third parties to determine the state of title and the location of boundaries
reliably and at relatively low cost. As discussed previously, the patent, trade-
mark, and copyright systems fall well short of the ideal.
From a notice standpoint, there are strong reasons to require prompt pub-
lication of all patent applications in order to inform intangible resource






























developers of the scope of potential rights affecting their investments. As high-
lighted earlier, RIM wandered into such a mine field unwittingly. The subse-
quent litigation consumed substantial financial resources and needlessly
disrupted the development of wireless email technology. Patent notice could
be significantly improved merely by requiring patent applications to be publicly
available immediately upon filing.27
Patent application secrecy has been justified as an inducement for inventors
to choose patent protection rather than trade secrecy.28 This justification for
application secrecy has not been carefully scrutinized and there are good rea-
sons to question its cogency. We are not aware of any evidence that 18 months
of secrecy actually induces a significant number of inventors to choose patents
instead of secrecy. It is clear that many inventors never consider secrecy because
it is simply not feasible for composition and product inventions that disclose
their elements. More importantly, for all the patent applications that would be
submitted regardless of whether applications are kept secret for 18 months—
society loses the disclosure and notice benefits for those 18 months.
Incompleteness rather than secrecy is the main problem with the copyright
(Sprigman 2004; cf., Ginsburg 2010) and trademark registries. Registration is
not required for parties to obtain copyright and trademark rights. Moreover,
copyright owners bear no legal responsibility to update their ownership infor-
mation. Registration is required to enforce a copyright on a U.S. work in
court,29 but trademark owners can bring suit in federal court even for unregis-
tered marks (Lanham Act § 43(a); 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)). Technological advances
have enabled the development of accessible registries at relatively low cost.
Notice externality concerns reinforce calls to re-examine the Berne
Convention principle disfavoring copyright formalities (Sprigman 2004; U.S.
Copyright Office 2006).
Since federal trademark law protects unregistered marks, and all manner of
indications—from word marks and logos to trade dress (nonfunctional aspects
of product shape and packaging)—can be “owned” and yet be untraceable.
Notice policy favors eliminating protection for unregistered trademarks,
thereby assuring the trademark registry that completely covers federally en-
forceable trademark rights.
27 Relatedly, the PTO could require parties to record changes in patent ownership immediately upon
execution of the transfer. The ability to mask true ownership imposes costs upon competitors and
cumulative inventors in identifying relevant counterparties.
28 The law discourages secrecy because patent disclosures potentially contribute to scientific and en-
gineering knowledge.
29 Owners of works of foreign origin never need to register their works.































For land, the quality of disclosure is relatively straightforward. Land boundaries
can be identified with high precision based on historical tract indices and sur-
veying techniques. Land usage and informal agreements can complicate pub-
licly available information, but such problems are relatively rare.
Trademark law mandates significant disclosure by registrants. They must
provide a description “for any mark not in standard characters” (TMEP
§808.01), explanation of any special meaning of a term in a mark to the relevant
industry (TMEP §808.01(a)), designations of goods and services (15 U.S.C.
§§1051(a)(2) and (b)(2); 37 C.F.R. §2.32(a)(6); TMEP §§1402 et seq.), and,
importantly, disclaimers. Section 6 of the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. §1056) gives
trademark examiners discretion to “require the applicant to disclaim an unre-
gistrable component of a mark otherwise registerable.” Many trademark regis-
trations today expressly disclaim subject matter.30
Copyright law does not mandate much disclosure from copyright registrants,
just general information about the type of work and ownership of the copyright.
There is nothing comparable to the disclaimer practice in trademark law. This
distinction is significant because unlike tangible resources, copyright protection
does not extend to all aspects of a work. Unoriginal, functional, and other
public domain elements fall outside of the copyright protection. Given that
nearly all works comprise and build upon unprotected elements, cumulative
creators can face a difficult task determining the aspects of a copyrighted work
in which copyright subsists. Copyright registration forms ask copyright owners
to provide “a brief general statement” of what has been added to preexisting
material on which a derivative work or compilation has been based,31 but such
statements rarely provide a clear indication of what aspects of the work are not
protected and do not disclaim protection in a reliable manner.
The quality of patent disclosure varies tremendously. At one extreme, chem-
ical composition claims disclose a specific molecular structure. At the other
extreme, software process claims can be vague and still clear the written de-
scription, enablement, and best mode disclosure requirements.32 Unlike
30 See U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (2011) (reporting that during the 18 month period from April
16, 2008 through October 16, 2010, approximately 29% of the first Office actions (not including
examiner’s amendments), 6% of the final Office actions, and 5.5% of the appeals to the Trademark
Trial and Appeal Board contained a disclaimer requirement).
31 See, for example, U.S. Copyright Office Form TX (literary works) <http://www.copyright.gov/
forms/formtx.pdf>.
32 See 35 U.S.C. §112; Northern Telecom, Inc. v. Datapoint Corp., 908 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (holding
that software patent applications need only high level functional descriptions); Fonar Corp. v.
General Electric Co., 107 F.3d 1543 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that software patent applications
need not disclose flowcharts or source code). See generally Fromer (2009).






























copyrights and trademarks, which involve actual physical or graphic embodi-
ments, many patent claims are inherently abstract. The scope of a patent need
not align with the patentee’s actual device or process. Furthermore, many pa-
tentees do not practice their invention. Patents are defined by the claim lan-
guage, which can be ambiguous. By seeking broad and vague functional claims
(as well as specific claims), the patentee maximizes the likelihood that the
patent can be stretched to reach unforeseen competing technologies during
the patent life. Patents necessarily exclude prior art—a statutorily complex
body of knowledge that predates the invention date—which can also be am-
biguous in scope. The imprecision of patent claim scope in the software and
business method fields is so bad that many developers ignore patents at the
front-end and deal with licensing and litigation (Lemley 2008; Bessen & Meurer
2008).
The quality of patent disclosure can be improved by adding teeth to the
written description, claim indefiniteness, and best mode doctrines. Recent de-
velopments in the law have cut in both directions. During the past year, the
PTO has initiated rulemaking to assist examiners in carrying out their respon-
sibilities in implementing the claim indefiniteness standard set forth in Section
112, Paragraph 2 with particular emphasis on computer-implemented inven-
tion claims.33 On the other hand, the recently enacted America Invents Act
largely eliminates enforcement of the best mode requirement.34
Furthermore, the PTO could require applicants to do more to clarify claim
scope and the basis for examination. Applicants could be required to resolve
commonly litigated claim scope issues up-front such as: (i) whether the claim
preamble is a limitation; (ii) whether a claim term is intended to be
“means-plus-function”; (iii) the precise “corresponding structure, material,
or acts” associated with “means-plus-function” claim limitations via hypertext;
(iv) whether embodiments in a claim are intended as illustrations or limita-
tions; and (v) the delineation of claim restrictions on a claim-by-claim basis
through inclusion of standardized format claim charts. Second, applicants
could be required to designate a default dictionary for use in construing all
claim terms that are not specifically defined. Third, applicants could be required
to disclose the relevance of all prior art set forth in their information disclosure
statement. Fourth, technology groups within the PTO could develop default
glossaries for commonly used terms of art that arise frequently in applications
33 See U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Supplementary Examination Guidelines for Determining
Compliance With 35 U.S.C. 112 and for Treatment of Related Issues in Patent Applications, 76
Fed. Reg. 7162 (February 9, 2011).
34 See America Invents Act § 15 (excluding failure to satisfy the best mode requirement from the bases
for invalidating a patent in litigation).






























within their field. Applications would be interpreted based on those definitions
unless applicants set forth their own definition. Fifth, examiners should scru-
tinize applications for claim breadth, clarity, and numerosity. Sixth, examiners
could record all interviews with applicants and place such recordings on the
public record.
This disclosure wish list would likely increase the time and effort required to
prepare patent applications. The work, however, would reduce the effort to
conduct high-quality examination. As Mark Lemley (2001) has suggested,
there is critical tradeoff between ex ante examination screening and the rela-
tively rare ex post judicial scrutiny of issued patents. This analysis needs to
consider the many costs of low-quality (i.e., unwarranted and/or overbroad)
patents on technological innovation generally. Even patents that do not get
eliminated from the system through judicial invalidation nonetheless can dis-
rupt development and diffusion of technology. We are inclined to the view that
increasing the burden on applicants to explain, clarify, and justify their filings—
particularly in amorphous areas such as software and business methods—will
greatly improve examination quality and the overall functioning of the patent
system.
4.1.3 Reliable and Prompt Examination
Land offices merely record ownership, liens, and encumbrances associated with
existing resources. Hence, it is not difficult for them to provide prompt and
reliable notice of land claims. Copyright registration and trademark registra-
tions are also relatively prompt with regard to those works and marks that are
registered. In contrast, the PTO has a much more challenging task in that it
must determine whether applications meet the Patent Act’s subject matter,
utility, novelty, nonobviousness, and written description requirements. This
requires careful scrutiny of potentially long and complex applications, search-
ing of prior art, and comparison of prior art to patent claims.35
First and foremost, the PTO should be provided sufficient resources to
ensure prompt, high quality examination. In general, these costs should be
borne by the applicants and should be tailored to the costs of examining
particular applications (or at least classes of applications). Applicants seeking
numerous amorphous claims should pay the substantial cost of fully scrutiniz-
ing such applications. They should also pay substantial additional fees for re-
questing continuations. Just as a home contractor will not add an additional
room onto a house project without a substantial change order, the PTO should
35 Burk and Lemley (2009b) report that patent examiners spend approximately 18 hours per
application.






























have authority to ensure that applicants bear the full costs of ensuring a thor-
ough and careful examination.
The PTO has recently proposed tiering of application fees to enable acceler-
ated examination for a higher fee. Mark Lemley and Douglas Lichtman (2007)
would go further and allow applicants to purchase more or less rigorous exam-
ination in exchange for stronger or weaker presumptions of validity. Another
proposal would allow for delayed examination to reduce the effective backlog
on examiners. Many other jurisdictions allow applicants to defer examination,
which amounts to a trade of deferred fee payment at the price of fewer years of
protection.
Second, the PTO should implement more sophisticated patent quality review
procedures and make greater efforts to retain the most effective examiners. Such
procedures should evaluate examination quality on the basis of correctness of
validity determinations and scrutiny of patent boundaries.
Third, the Patent Office should scale back continuation practice with par-
ticular focus on the problem of notice externalities (Lemley & Moore 2004).
The continuation game, in conjunction with the secrecy of patent applications,
vastly expands the opportunity for applicants to gain unfair advantage against
practicing entities and competitors.
Fourth, in line with recent amendments expanding pre-issuance submission
of prior art by third parties and enhancing postgrant review (America Invents
Act §§ 6–8), greater efforts should be made to expand the ability of the public to
provide prior art and analysis to the PTO.
4.1.4 Registry Accessibility
The availability of a transparent, accessible, and easily searchable registry pro-
vides one of the best antidotes to notice externalities. Intellectual property law
should strive to empower developers to identify all potential impediments to
their projects and the counterparties with whom they can resolve differences. 36
As noted in Section 3.2.2, the lack of comprehensiveness of intellectual prop-
erty registries undermine the accessibility of notice information. But even if all
intellectual property claims were registered, there would still be the problem of
determining the contours of the development neighborhood. The patent clas-
sification system does not provide the ability to determine all potentially rele-
vant neighbors with precision or at reasonable cost. For example, a new digital
dashboard technology might infringe all manner of software patents, yet a
search of automobile patents would likely miss many encumbrances. Unlike
land claims that can be accurately captured on a two-dimensional grid and be
36 See Meurer (2011) for a model of how the law influences patent search activity.






























physically inspected, patent claims are abstract and multidimensional. The de-
velopment of Boolean search tools has helped, but the vast proliferation of
patents, particularly in the software field, has made searching patent records
particularly difficult. Registered copyrights and nonword trademarks can also
be difficult to search for analogous reasons.
Thus, subsidizing the development, maintenance, and evolution of intellec-
tual property registry search tools and portals can play an important role in
supporting accessible notice information. The government further contributes
to good notice by standardizing the way that new property rights are claimed
and by developing taxonomies and classifying property rights. The PTO main-
tains the Acceptable Identification of Goods and Services Manual to classify
trademarks, and the U.S. Patent Classification to classify patents.37
Looking forward, the government could make investments in infrastructure
to reduce the cost of searching for patents and copyrights. These investments
would produce public goods that tend to be underprovided by the private
sector. On the copyright side, advances in content identification technology
have vastly improved the ability to match uploaded works to digital reposi-
tories, such as YouTube. Such systems could be deployed to allow anyone to
scan an image and instantaneously obtain accurate data on the copyright status.
If combined with re-introduction of copyright formalities, prospective users of
works could relatively easily identify the owners. In addition, further resources
could be devoted to collecting and organizing rights ownership databases. This
is a particular problem in the music field.
One of the most pressing needs in the patent field is the development of
standard terminology for use in software inventions. Chemical patent bound-
aries are more easily understood and searchable because patent attorneys and
inventors rely heavily on a system of chemical nomenclature developed and
maintained by the International Union for Pure and Applied Chemistry. There
is no guarantee that an equally successful system can be developed for software
inventions, but the idea has drawn the attention of the IEEE Standards
Association and other nongovernmental organizations, who are working on
developing standard software nomenclature. One bit of evidence suggesting
progress could be made on this front comes from semiconductor patents,
where the Texas Instruments TTL Data Book has become a de facto standard
for naming certain components of semiconductor inventions.
Property systems differ in the role the government plays in crafting property
boundaries. Intellectual property owners inevitably play a significant role in
37 There are international counterparts of both of these systems. The PTO is currently working with
other patent offices to improve and harmonize patent classification.






























determining boundaries when they create an intangible asset. If intellectual
property law limited protection to literal copying of tangible embodiments of
creations, then there would be no role for the government in specifying bound-
aries. The challenge for intellectual property systems comes from setting the
scope of owners’ rights against approximate or nonliteral copying and affording
prospective developers the ability to determine potential encumbrances
through searching public registries. Greater effort devoted to improving the
comprehensiveness and accessibility of intangible registries could substantially
reduce notice externalities.
4.1.5 Clear Marking of Resources
Marking of physical embodiments of works provides potential users of intan-
gible resources with notice of potential exposure. Patent, copyright, and trade-
mark law each encourage rights owners to mark physical embodiments of the
claimed works, although both patent and copyright law have weakened marking
requirements over the past several decades as well as penalties for failure to
provide accurate notice information. Since copyright protection only protects
owners against actual copies, a strong copyright marking requirement affords
potential users of a work useful information about whether copyright protec-
tion subsists.38
Technological advances in product identification, information distribution
platforms, and scanning technologies open up promising avenues for enhan-
cing product marking of intellectual property rights. Universal product codes,
as embodied in barcodes and Aztec Codes (two-dimensional barcodes),39 which
can be scanned by smart phones, can be linked to websites that provide detailed
information about intellectual property rights. Almost all products today use
product codes. Congress could pass legislation requiring any company selling
products embodying intellectual property rights to maintain a website provid-
ing standardized information about all intellectual property rights associated
with those products. As companies acquire new rights, those websites could be
updated accordingly. Such a system would not resolve all intellectual property
notice problems, but it would enhance access to such information and provide
38 A user of an unmarked work would, however, need to be careful to ensure that the copy was
authorized. Copying of an unmarked, pirated work would not provide a defense.
39 The Aztec Code was invented in 1995. See Aztec Code http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aztec_Code






























useful records for tracking intellectual property rights. We build on this pro-
posal in the final section.
4.1.6 Dispute Resolution Institutions
As discussed in Section 3.3.2 with the exception of trademark law’s ITU process,
intellectual property regimes provide little in the way of preclearance review of
products and uses. This represents a major problem for developers of new
technologies as well as authors and artists. The inability to test the scope of
intellectual property rights without risking substantial investment and liability
exposure discourages innovative projects and might lead to overly prudent
licensing. This inclination toward licensing could produce an undesirable feed-
back mechanism, whereby the licensing itself becomes proof that the entitle-
ment covers the use (Gibson 2007). Whether or not that occurs, it is troubling
that potential users of prior works or even independent developers of techno-
logical products cannot obtain clear ex ante rulings short of risking infringe-
ment litigation.
As noted previously, the DMCA introduced innovative mechanisms for
insulating OSPs while expediting blocking of infringing websites and tailoring
the scope of the anticircumvention provisions in advance of substantial expos-
ure. Such creative enforcement tools and regulatory flexibility could alleviate
some of the problems associated with the high costs of tracing ownership and
navigating some of copyright law’s amorphous standards (Menell 2002; Liu
2004; Tushnet 2010; Singh 2011). Furthermore, there is good reason to consider
preclearance processes for fair use determinations (Nimmer 2006; Carroll
2007). On the other hand, addressing these problems administratively could
stand in the way of potentially more promising market-based solutions (Merges
1996).
* * * * *
By comparison to real property notice infrastructure, intellectual resource
notice rules and institutions are notably incomplete. There are significant
opportunities to improve the quality of public registries and afford developers
better means of determining potential encumbrances and relevant counterpar-
ties in advance of incurring large investments and exposure to significant
liability. Merely requiring those claiming intangible resources to promptly
and fully disclose their claims would substantially limit the extent of notice
externalities. Developing preclearance institutions poses significant challenges,
but is worth exploring. Filling these gaps, however, will not entirely eliminate
notice externalities due to the inherent ambiguity of many intangible resources.
Hence, it will be worthwhile to explore other tools for internalizing notice
externalities and reducing their adverse effects on resource development.






























4.2 Internalizing Notice Externalities
Land registration rules and institutions work relatively well at providing notice
to property developers and therefore neither policymakers nor courts have
developed rules for internalizing notice externalities.40 Such tools hold signifi-
cant unrealized promise for improving intangible resource notice.
Even though society seeks to encourage invention and creativity through
granting intellectual property rights, the process of claiming such resources
and the amorphous nature of some intellectual property boundaries and
rights can impose substantial costs upon the broader community of inventors
and creators. As a result, intellectual property systems raise the risks and costs of
developing intangible resources, which can dampen the very incentives that
intellectual property law seeks to stimulate. Those who finance innovation
will integrate those risks and costs into their investment decisions. Inventors
and creators might be discouraged by having to deal with unknown and un-
knowable claimants after great effort has been expended. Notice externalities
result in economic waste to the extent that ex ante negotiation might have
resolved the encumbrance risks at the front-end rather than at the back-end.
The “net” effects of intellectual property regimes may well be positive, but there
is little question that overall social welfare could be improved by reducing the
notice externalities.
Scholarship on externalities teaches that prices and penalties are tools that
can be used to internalize external costs. Section 1 shows how application and
maintenance fees can be used to “price” notice externalities. Section 2 shows
that the content of intellectual property law can be shaped to “penalize” parties
who exploit notice externalities.
4.2.1 Prices and Subsidies
Nearly a century ago, Arthur C. Pigou (1920) famously proposed imposing the
external costs of the harmful activity on the entity causing the adverse effects on
third parties (see also Baumol 1972). Such Pigouvian taxes (or better perhaps
better characterized in the current political era as Pigouvian “user fees”) are
widely used throughout the economy to alter the activity levels of harm-causing
conduct. The classic example is imposing an effluent charge to control pollu-
tion. If a factory is required to bear a fee equal to the marginal social cost of its
pollution, then it will internalize the social cost of pollution discharge—which
will result in the efficient level of the polluting activity.41
40 As we will see in Section 4.3, however, courts have developed doctrines to reduce some of the harms
from notice externalities in real property contexts.






























The corresponding policy instrument with respect to notice externalities
would be to impose a user fee equal to the marginal social notice cost of
property claiming activities. William Landes and Richard Posner (2003) pro-
pose imposing modest, periodic fees on copyright owners to keep their copy-
rights in force. These fees could be chosen to respond to the hold-up risk
associated with old, low-value copyrights. Owners of high-value copyrights
would pay the fees and keep their copyrights in force, whereas owners of
low-value copyrights would allow their rights to lapse.42 Such a policy could
have substantially alleviated the search and negotiation costs incurred in clear-
ing the Eyes on the Prize DVD.
Likewise, notice costs in the patent system can be controlled through the use of
fees.43 Economists find that the volume of patent applications falls in response to
an increase in application fees, and the decision to maintain an issued patent in
force is sensitive to the magnitude of maintenance fees.44 Even the very low main-
tenance fees imposed today cause the majority of U.S. patents to lapse before their
full term has run (Moore 2005b).45 Higher maintenance fees can be a desirable
way to clear away patents on inventions that have not been commercialized, so as
to provide greater freedom for developers who are willing to take on the costs of
commercializing products (Parchomovsky & Wagner 2005).
Patent fee-setting garnered significant attention during discussion leading up
to adoption of the America Invents Act. Most of the focus, however, was on
increasing PTO staffing to address the large and growing patent backlog.
Although we believe that increased PTO funding is called for to improve the
41 Economic analysis of tort law distinguishes decisions to take care from decisions about activity level
(Polinsky & Shavell 2007). Successful internalization of an externality responds to both of these
choices. A manufacturer who internalizes product safety risks will typically adjust both product
design and output to account for accident costs. Similarly, when parties acquire new property, they
should consider both how they claim the new property and the number of new rights they claim. Since
intellectual property rights inevitably suffer from some degree of notice imperfection, policy analysts
must also pay attention to how many rights are created (activity level).
42 Landes and Posner (2003, 474) interpret their empirical research as showing that “most copyrights
depreciate rapidly and therefore that few would be renewed if even a slight fee were required.”
43 This policy could reduce clearance costs and the risk of inadvertent patent infringement but it does
not address other notice problems, such as secret applications and amorphous claims. Reducing the
number of applications might indirectly yield higher examination quality, but that would depend on
examination resources and incentives to bring forth prior art.
44 A recent survey of the empirical research finds inelastic responses of applications and renewals to
fees (de Rassenfosse & Pottelsberghe 2010). This indicates that significant fee increases may be
required to affect patenting activity. But administrative fees in the USA are very low when compared
to the legal fees paid to get a patent. Therefore, a substantial increase in PTO fees does not necessarily
mean a substantial increase in total fees that must be paid to acquire a patent.
45 This is consistent with patents elsewhere in the world (Pakes).






























speed and quality of patent examination, simple cost recovery is an incomplete
way to think about fees. Instead patent (and also copyright and trademark) fees
should be set so that applicants internalize not only the costs that they impose
on the government, but also the costs that they impose on third parties. 46
Ideally, fees should be relatively higher on inventions that are apt to generate
higher notice costs. Software patents, for example, are likely to impose greater
notice costs than chemical composition patents. The number of inventions per
product tend to be much greater for software than for chemical compositions
(Bessen & Meurer 2008). Furthermore, software patent boundaries tend to be
much harder to discern causing more claim construction disputes and more
inadvertent infringement (id.). Thus, strictly on notice grounds, stiffer fees
should be imposed on software patents than on chemical composition pa-
tents.47 The larger point is that fees are tools that can and should be used to
influence the decision to apply for a patent, the number of claims to include,
and the length of time for which the patent is maintained in force.
Internalization can also be implemented through a system of tradeable patent
permits (Ayres & Parchomovsky 2007; Dales 1968). In an ideal world, a
policy-maker with full information could equally well regulate private
decision-makers by collecting patent fees or by specifying the quantity of pa-
tents that can be granted. Permits alone or a permit fee hybrid system would
alleviate notice externalities and in theory could be superior to regulation by fees
alone.
As noted in Section 4.1.4, the government can also address notice problems
through subsidization of technologies and databases that improve the quality of
notice information. For example, the PTO could expend greater resources on
development of better technology classification systems and search tools.
Similarly, the Copyright Office can digitize its records and develop better pub-
licly accessible search tools.
46 Rather than focusing on notice costs, economists have studied renewal fees as a tool for tailoring the
reward provided by a patent system that has a fixed term (Cornelli & Schankerman 1999; Scotchmer
1999). Another strand of the literature examines fees as a tool that could be used to internalize the
congestion costs that one patent applicant imposes on another (Marco & Prieger 2009). In contrast,
legal scholars have noted that patent fees can be used to mitigate “prosecution externalties” arising
from efforts to build large patent portfolios (Parchomovsky & Wagner 2005) and fees can be used to
discourage marginal patent applications that generate notice costs by increasing clearance search
cost (Collins 2008).
47 Other policy concerns besides notice should also be considered. Advances in chemical technology
tend to be less cumulative than advances in software technology. Economic analysis suggests that
excessive patenting is a greater risk for cumulative technologies, and this may be a separate reason to
favor higher fees on software patents.































Property law can be structured in such a way that it penalizes a property owner
who provides poor notice. The law can penalize property owners by reducing
the damages they can collect, limiting the scope of their property right, or
invalidating their property right. These penalties internalize notice costs
when they are triggered by acts that degrade boundary information, hide the
ownership or existence of a property right, or strategically delay enforcement.
Thus, prices and penalties play distinct roles. User fees respond to notice costs
caused when property owners acquire too many rights or keep those rights in
force too long. Penalties respond to notice costs caused when property owners
obfuscate, hide, and delay.
Courts have developed several doctrines to penalize patent owners who hide
their patents (Hovenkamp 2011). As noted previously, the courts have
struggled to resolve antitrust claims against and patent enforcement actions
by Rambus in the wake of its less than forthright participation in an industry
SSO.48 The courts blocked Dell’s enforcement of patents that it failed to disclose
as part of a standard setting process (In re Dell Computer Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616,
617–19 (1996)). In another case involving failure to disclose patent filings
during a standard setting process, the court applied the doctrine of equitable
estoppel to block enforcement of a patent (Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp.,
548 F.3d 1004, 1018 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
The law can also penalize rights owners who fail to assert their rights
promptly upon learning of infringing activities. Thus nonpracticing entities
as well as copyright holders who are not easily traced could be barred from
recovery or have their recoveries limited- if they opportunistically delay pros-
ecution or enforcement (Meurer 2003; Symbol Techs. Inc. v. Lemelson Med., 277
F.3d 1361, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2002); A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides
Construction Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1040 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
Section 112 of the Patent Act spells out the key obligations of patent appli-
cants to communicate clear boundary information. Failure to comply with
these requirements narrows the scope of the patent by invalidating the defective
claims. Claims can be invalidated for lack of definiteness, for lack of support in
the written description, and because they are not enabled by the patent disclos-
ure. The Federal Circuit has tightened the written description requirement as a
means to police strategic stretching of patent claims to ensnare new products
48 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) penalized Rambus for “deceptively fail[ing] to disclose to the
[standard setting organization] the patent interests it held in four technologies that were
standardized.” See, In the matter of Rambus, Inc., Docket No. 9302, 3 (August 2006). The D.C.
Circuit reversed the FTC on the grounds that the Commission did not properly establish causation
between the alleged acts of deception and acts of monopolization in violation of Section 2 of the
Sherman Act and Section 5 of the FTC Act. See, Rambus v. FTC, 522 F.3d. 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008).






























introduced by competitors (Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc); Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473
(Fed. Cir. 1998)). Unfortunately, the courts have promulgated a permissive
enablement standard for software inventions (Burk & Lemley 2009b, 61–62)
and largely eviscerated the claim definiteness requirement. Claims are invali-
dated for indefiniteness only if they are “insolubly ambiguous” (Marley
Mouldings, Ltd. v. Mikron Indus., 417 F.3d 1356, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
Design of effective penalties to induce improved disclosure and claim draft-
ing is a great challenge. We identified PTO fees as an appropriate tool for
internalizing notice externalities caused by too many property rights. Fees are
a simple, ex ante solution to problems involving discrete choices, such as
whether to apply for a patent, how many claims to add, and how long to
maintain a patent in force. As ex post financial levers, penalties can be more
finely tuned. They are typically determined after a dispute has arisen. Courts
have greater ability to ferret out more detailed information about the activities
in question (Kaplow 1992). Greater subtlety is essential in inducing an inventor
to disclose the right information or claim an invention clearly. 49
4.3 Harm-Reducing Policies
A third approach to addressing notice externalities is to limit the harm to those
resource developers who cannot reasonably determine the landscape of encum-
brances. Real property law has developed various doctrines for decreasing the
disruption caused by notice failure.50 Rose (1985, 78) observed that “[s]ociety is
worst off in a world of vague claims; no one knows whether he can safely use the
land, or from whom he should buy it if it is already claimed, the land may end up
being used by too many people or by none at all.” The doctrine of adverse
possession is one tool the law uses to prevent stale claims from being asserted
(Merrill 1985a; Singer 1987). Courts are also disinclined to read property interests
broadly, when they suspect claimants are engaging in opportunistic behavior
(Faus v. City of Los Angeles, 67 Cal.2d 350, 431 P.2d 849, 62 Cal.Rptr. 193
(Cal. S. Ct. 1967). In some states, good faith improvers of land can take title
to improved property subject to compensating the original owner for the value of
the land prior to the improvements (Good Faith Improver Act, Cal. C. Civ. Proc.
§§ 871.1–7; Raab v. Casper, 124 Cal. Rptr. 590 (Ct. App. 1975)). Limitations on
the running of nonpossessory interests promote notice and constrain assertion of
49 Meurer and Nard (2005) explain how limits on the patent law doctrine of equivalents, such as the
prosecution history estoppel doctrine can be used to penalize patent applicants who invest too little
effort in drafting clear claim language.
50 Sterk (2008) suggests that high search costs can explain the unwillingness of the courts to award
injunctive relief in cases of “innocent” boundary encroachments.






























remote property interests (French 1982, 1998; Sterk 1985; Tulk v. Moxhay, (1848)
41 Eng. Rep. 1143(Ch.) 1143–45; Ames 1904; Van Houweling 2008, 891–99; see
generally, Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes 2000).
Policies aimed at reducing the harms associated with notice failure already
play a significant role in intangible resource law. They can be usefully divided
into three categories: (i) liability standards; (ii) remedies; and (iii)
de-propertization.
4.3.1 Liability Standards
Liability standards cover a wide range of policy levers: required liability elem-
ents, defenses, exemptions, compulsory licenses, and safe harbors. These poli-
cies serve a variety of purposes. We focus on doctrinal and statutory
adjustments to reduce harm from inadequate notice, but such benefits
should be weighed in conjunction with their effects on other purposes of the
intellectual property regimes (such as appropriability).
Unlike patent or trademark law, copyright law requires the rights owner to
demonstrate copying by the defendant as an element in proving infringement
(Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946)). As a result, developers can
insulate their projects from infringement claims by carefully documenting in-
dependent creation. This is commonly done in the software industry as a means
of developing interoperable, yet noninfringing, programs, and products. This
approach cannot be used where the developer seeks to incorporate full or sig-
nificant expressive features of copyrighted works into their project.
In contrast, patents can be infringed through entirely independent activities.
In fact, relatively few patent infringement cases outside of Hatch–Waxman
actions (which inherently involve copying to provoke a challenge) involve
copying (Bessen & Meurer 2008; Cotropia & Lemley 2009). Given the difficulty
of determining the patent neighborhood—secret patent applications, prolifer-
ation of patents, amorphous claims—a strong case can be made for prior user
rights and/or an independent creation defense.51 At a minimum, such policy
reforms appear justified in the software field, where various conditions—such
as alternative means of appropriability (first-mover advantages, copyright pro-
tection, and trade secret protection), low capital costs, and relatively low
technological risk (Menell 1987)—obviate patent protection and opportunistic
enforcement predominates. The independent invention defense would go a
long way toward limiting the risk posed by opportunistic entities. It would
also improve the conditions needed to support a robust insurance market for
51 Other scholars have also advocated these policies, although not primarily on notice grounds (Lemley
2007, 1534–35; Vermont 2006; Shapiro 2006; Maurer & Scotchmer 2002; Harriel 1996).






























spreading the risks of patent claims. In contrast, given the high capital costs of
pharmaceutical research, the risk of near-simultaneous invention in conjunc-
tion with an independent invention defense could reduce invention incentives
by diminishing appropriability.
The law can also reduce exposure to inadequately disclosed rights by crafting
limitations on the scope of rights (Hargreaves 2011). The Copyright Act creates
several relatively bright line exemptions that insulate users from liability when
transaction costs are apt to be high (Fagundes 2009). For example, the
Copyright Act expressly permits pictorial representations of architectural
works “if the building in which the work is embodied is located in or ordinarily
visible from a public place” (17 U.S.C. § 120(a)). Categorical fair use designa-
tions could further improve notice, for example, by creating a 30 second rule for
sound or film clips in particular contexts. Any such rule would undoubtedly
prove to be over- and underinclusive. But given the unavailability of effective
preclearance institutions and the substantial uncertainty and cost surrounding
fair use adjudication, clear but imprecise rule might be the better approach in
areas with high transaction costs.
4.3.2 Remedies
The type and size of remedies greatly affect the chilling effects of notice failure
(Hovenkamp 2011). The Supreme Court’s eBay decision affords courts sub-
stantial discretion to consider opportunistic enforcement of intellectual prop-
erty rights (eBay v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388 (2006)). Justice Kennedy’s
concurring opinion expressed concern about patent owners using the threat
of an injunction “as a bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees to companies
that seek to buy licenses to practice the patent.” (Id. at 396.) He went on to note
that injunctive relief “may have different consequences for the burgeoning
number of patents over business methods, which were not of much economic
and legal significance in earlier times. The potential vagueness and suspect
validity of some of these patents may affect the calculus under the four-factor
test.” (Id. at 397.)
The awarding of damages presents a useful place to integrate concerns about
notice externalities. There is good to reason to discount damage awards in those
circumstances in which it is particularly difficult to identify and evaluate intel-
lectual property encumbrances,52 the boundaries surrounding the plaintiff’s
rights are amorphous, or where the law is ambiguous (e.g., fair use, doctrine
of equivalents). Courts should be wary of awarding substantial liability where
there is little if any evidence of harm. This is particularly true in the context of
52 This could be true in the context of patent thickets and orphan works.






























statutory damages, which can be wholly disproportionate to harm with respect
to Internet-related activities.
Ronald Coase’s (1960) seminal observation about the reciprocal nature of
harm provides a useful perspective for thinking about uncertain resource rights
and boundaries. It is ambiguous whether the social cost of developing a com-
peting product near a patent boundary or moderately transforming a copy-
righted work should be imposed entirely on the developer of the “neighboring
work,” the rights owner, or shared between the two. Since transactions are not
costless, the law needs to strike the balance. Since society seeks to promote both
pioneering works and cumulative creativity, the better approach could well be
to apportion liability in contexts in which a modestly infringing neighboring
work could not feasibly be cleared or where the rights holder unreasonably
withheld consent or opportunistically delayed enforcement (cf., Menell &
Depoorter 2012). This can usefully be analogized to a comparative negligence
regime (Calabresi 1975; Sterk 2011; Prosser 1953).
4.3.3 De-Propertization
A more aggressive reform strategy calls for a shift away from proprietary rights
systems altogether. Harold Demsetz (1967) theorized that private property
rights emerge over time as the value of the asset subject to the property
rights increases, and as the costs of measuring, monitoring, and enforcing pri-
vate property rights decreases. By extension, as the costs of identifying and
avoiding property rights rise, then policy should move away from propertiza-
tion (cf., Smith 2002). We have long questioned the wisdom of patent protec-
tion for computer software and business methods on notice and other grounds
(Menell 1987, 2007a; Bessen & Meurer 2008). Similarly, there are serious ques-
tions about whether photography should enjoy the full duration and range of
protections afforded other copyrighted works (cf., Hughes 2012).
Open source and open innovation projects seek to achieve de-propertization
by precommitting inventors and creators to not propertizing their creations
(Carver 2005). Many of these initiatives also impose strong disclosure re-
quirements that directly address notice externalities (e.g., General Public
License v3 http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/gpl.html). By their essential design,
however, these projects opt-out of the primary justification for intellectual
property: appropriability. It is a testament to how problematic the software
marketplace has become that many leading commercial enterprises have chosen
the open source path (Merges 2004).






























4.4 Hybrid Policies and Policy Innovations
Although our policy framework divides into three separate conceptual
spheres—notice infrastructure, internalization, and harm reduction—many
policy reforms cut across these domains. Improved public registries lessen
notice externalities, effectively reducing the need to internalize the social
costs of notice failure and for harm-reducing policies. Many of the
harm-reduction policies have the collateral effect of internalizing notice extern-
alities by reducing the potential reward for infringement actions. They function
as penalties for inadequate notice.
Our analysis highlights some enticing low-hanging notice policy reforms.
There would appear to be substantial advantages to mandating prompt
public notice for all intellectual resources on publicly accessible and readily
searchable digital registries. Patent applications ought to be published imme-
diately upon filing. Copyright claimants should be required to register their
claims and maintain accurate information about ownership and subsistence.
Trademark claimants should be required to register their marks. We also believe
that application and maintenance fees should be rethought as means of inter-
nalizing the social costs of intangible resource proliferation.
We recognize that there are counterarguments to prompt, mandatory dis-
closure of intangible resource claims. These counterarguments, however, have
not been established through careful empirical or theoretical research. And in
many respects, they reflect anachronistic conditions. Perhaps the Berne
Convention’s principle that the enjoyment and exercise of copyright “shall
not be subject to any formality” made sense in 1886, but there is good
reason to believe that it is frustrating documentary filmmakers and other cu-
mulative creators today. At a minimum, notice concerns create a burden on
proponents for any regime that does not provide prompt, mandatory disclosure
as well as registry update and maintenance fees for intangible resources.
Advances in digital technology over the past two decades make it eminently
feasible to implement such requirements efficiently and effectively.
Beyond these relatively straightforward ramifications of the notice externality
framework, the notice lens illuminates some promising innovative policy mech-
anisms for improving the functioning of intangible resource regimes. We sketch
two such regimes below. Section 1 explores the use of a hybrid property tax
mechanism/liability cap to reveal valuable information about which patent
applications pose potential exposure, internalize notice externalities, and en-
hance resource developers’ ability to manage development risks. We recognize
no misapprehension that such a reform could produce complex effects and calls
for extensive deliberation; our treatment merely sketches a conceptual model.
Nonetheless, we believe that the exercise highlights useful insights for






























addressing notice problems for highly congested and amorphous resource con-
texts. Section 2 examines how advances in digital technology could be used to
assist developers of creative works to identify potentially infringed works, clear
such works, and/or obtain safe harbor. These proposals barely scratch the sur-
face of innovatice solutions to notice externality problems.
4.4.1 Patent Revelation Mechanism: Intangible Property Taxes/Damage Caps
Google’s chief legal officer commented that “a modern smartphone might be
susceptible to as many as 250,000 potential patent claims” (Lohr 2011; see also
Phelps & Kline 2009). The notice problem is so severe that competitors in many
high tech fields do not even bother trying to learn about potential encum-
brances (Lemley 2008).53 The costs of due diligence and the difficulty of ex
ante bargaining lead technology developers to deal with these patent thickets
through building defensive patent portfolios and ex post bargaining and dispute
resolution. Defensive patenting can itself exacerbate the notice problem as
patent portfolios developed by practicing entities fall into the hands of more
opportunistic enterprises (Phelps & Kline 2009; Chien 2010; Hagui & Yoffie
2011; Ewing 2011; Did Intellectual Ventures Drive Micron to Privateer Patent
Enforcement? (June 29, 2011), Gametime IP; Wild 2011).
This vicious cycle intensifies as patents proliferate. Various harm-reducing
policies—such as creating an independent invention defense/prior user right,
limitations on remedies for nonpracticing entities, and abolishing certain
classes of patents—partially address patent notice problems, but they do little
to screen bad patents at the front-end. In an ideal regime, greater emphasis
would be placed on weeding out unmeritorious patent applications and
enabling developers to determine which patents affect their development pro-
jects at the front-end. With that goal in mind, we offer an alternative approach
to patent reform that focuses on internalizing the costs of patents through a
mechanism that would call attention to the most significant patents.
We begin by reference to real estate taxation. Most jurisdictions impose
property user fees (or taxes) on real property owners as a means of spreading
the social cost of the land ownership within communities. Property fees are
generally scaled to property value. This reflects in part that larger and more
valuable properties demand greater public service costs—such as police, fire,
53 In contrast, pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies—and their financial backers—put sub-
stantial effort into determining potential patent barriers at the front-end of their research projects
(Eisenberg 2011). This is due to several factors including the high costs of R&D and regulatory
approval (which makes due diligence particularly important), the comparative clarity of compos-
ition claims, the relatively small number of researchers and patents in particular areas, and the
effective ability to know the patent and research neighborhood through professional circles.






























roads, education, local government, and other infrastructure. Such fees at least
partially internalize the user costs of real property ownership.54 Property fees
are also imposed over time. Communities can vary these fees as property values
change—through land improvements or market conditions.
Along those lines, patent filing and maintenance fees could be thought of as
internalizing the direct and external (notice) costs that patent applications and
issued patents impose on the public. But how should patents be valued for
purposes of imposing such fees? Patent valuation is particularly difficult (Kelley
2011; Parchomovsky & Wagner 2005; Allison, Lemley, & Walker 2009). Often
the holder of the patent is in the best position to know its value. This provides
an intriguing opportunity.
Our concept—which might be called the “Illuminating Needles in the Patent
Haystack Act”—offers a mechanism for revealing patent valuation through a
dual user fee/liability cap. Patent applicants would be required to disclose their
estimated patent valuation upon filing their application. This value would serve
several functions. First, it would provide a basis for assessing the filing fee for
reviewing the application, and if granted, maintenance fees for the issued
patent. By scaling the filing fee to the estimated value of the invention, the
PTO would get a clear signal of how many resources to devote to examination.
The maintenance fees would also be higher by analogy to property taxes.
Property taxes are scaled to property value in part because more valuable
properties typically entail higher municipal service costs. Similarly, more valu-
able patents impose a greater overhead costs on independent and cumulative
inventors. In essence, the maintenance fee would at least partially internalize
notice externalities.
A significant caveat is in order. In our ideal system, patent filing and main-
tenance fees would be scaled to the level of examination costs and external
effects of distinct patent fields (or neighborhoods). Thus, even very valuable
pharmaceutical patents might have relatively low maintenance fees because
there is reason to believe that notice externalities are relatively small in that
technology neighborhood. In contrast, maintenance fees for software patents
should be relatively high per dollar of valuation due to the large notice costs of
54 States impose royalties and taxes on hardrock mining operations on state lands, but the federal
government has never done the same for resources extracted from federal lands. See U.S. General
Accounting Office 2008, Hardrock Mining: Information on State Royalties and Trends in Mineral
Imports and Exports (July 21, 2008) <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08849r.pdf>; Obama fiscal
2012 budget proposes hardrock mining royalties, Platts (February 14, 2011) http://www.platts.com/
RSSFeedDetailedNews/RSSFeed/Metals/6830235. Firms extracting oil and gas from federal lands
and waters pay between 12.5% and 16.7% in royalty lease payments. See U.S. Federal Oil and
Gas Royalties, OpenCongress <http://www.opencongress.org/wiki/U.S._federal_oil_and_gas_
royalties>






























these ambiguous grants on software developers. Software patents lie in the
floodplain.
Why wouldn’t patent applicants simply choose a low value in order to min-
imize their fees? The back-end of our proposal addresses that problem. The
applicant’s value estimation would serve as a cap on total patent infringement
recoveries during the life of the patent. Thus, applicants would have a strong
incentive to pick a realistic value. This value would signal to competitors, which
needles in the patent haystack are potentially harmful to their businesses.
Competitors would have stronger incentives to submit prior art during exam-
ination and pursue postgrant oppositions, where patents have high damage
caps and are vulnerable to invalidation.
This mechanism would enable the PTO and competitors to identify those
patents that are worth their attention on the front-end. Competitors would be
in a position to self-insure against low-value patents and could seek to license or
insure against high-value patents. Patentees would more carefully prioritize
their portfolio development as they would face higher maintenance costs and
scrutiny on high-value patents.
We recognize that calibrating this proposal would be quite complicated.55
But the conceptual elements of this proposal highlight directions for improving
up-front patent quality screening, better notice, and affording developers
greater ability to understand the patent neighborhood. This proposal also em-
phasizes the importance of tailoring the patent system to particular technology
classes (Menell 1987; Burk & Lemley 2009b). Although there will always be
line-drawing problems, the heterogeneity of technological fields and external
costs of the patent system should push toward greater technological specificity
of patent rules and institutions. Notwithstanding its substantial implementa-
tion challenges, our proposal would shine a bright spotlight on the most im-
portant patents at the front-end of the technological development, thereby
affording competitors with choices about how to develop their technologies
and businesses with a better understanding of the neighborhood.
4.4.2 Copyright Revelation Mechanism: Digital Identification Safe Harbors
Advances in digital identification technologies over the past decade have created
the ability to identify audio, textual, graphic, and visual works at low cost and
with high precision. Audible Magic Corporation was among the first to develop
sophisticated acoustic fingerprinting technologies. It now provides audio and
55 For example, our proposed system would have to grapple with updating of patent valuation (with
the possibility of intervening damage limitations on those who entered the marketplace when patent
valuation was lower), allocating valuation among portfolios, and how patent caps would apply
across the marketplace.






























content identification tools to companies seeking to track digital media and
identify and block infringing content. Shazam offers an application that allows a
mobile phone to identify almost any sound recording. YouTube’s ContentID
(AudioID and VideoID) system enables content owners to block, monetize, and
track usage of their works within the YouTube’s expanding online ecosystem.
Although initially reluctant to participate, many content owners have opted in
to the YouTube platform and derive revenue from web traffic to their own and
user-generated videos that re-use their works (within the permissions that they
specify).
These technologies provide the framework for a universal copyright notifi-
cation system. If all copyrighted works were digitized and registered, which is
both feasible and consistent with the broader aims of the copyright system
(Menell 2007b), potential users of copyrighted works could employ relatively
inexpensive and now commonplace optical scanning and audio devices to
identify the copyright status of any registered work.56
A mandatory copyright registration and digital deposit system could provide
the foundation for a robust digital clearance system for copyright owners and
users. Suppose that a documentary filmmaker was seeking to use photographic
works of unknown provenance. Under a decentralized safe harbor regime (and
assuming no actual knowledge of the photograph’s copyright status and own-
ership), the filmmaker would scan the work using specified technology. If the
scan did not produce a match, then she would be able to use the work without
fear of injunctive relief. Furthermore, the scan would reduce costs in locating
true owners if a universal registration system were in place. As with orphan
work proposals, various forms of liability rules could be developed (ranging
from zero to fair market value) to address any legitimate copyright holder who
comes forward.
This system could create some problems for low resolution copies of works,
but such concerns are likely to be manageable. Documentary filmmakers (and
other users) have an incentive to obtain high-quality versions of whatever they
use. Although this system would not resolve fair use and bargaining break-
downs, it does resolve the problem of using untraceable works.
56 A parallel system could be used for identifying what patents cover a particular product or service.
Patent owners could be required to provide standardized optical recognition labels on their prod-
ucts. Digital cameras could scan those labels, which could link to the websites maintained by the
patentees with information on patent, copyright, and/or trademark protections. The relevant intel-
lectual property offices could establish rules for proper disclosure on such websites. Such databases
are now becoming fairly common for many products with barcodes and Aztec codes.






























5 . C O N C L U S I O N S
Notice problems have become a common pathology in the development of
intangible resources and markets. The proliferation of intellectual property
rights has greatly increased the costs of developing various intangible resources.
Inventors and creators, and the enterprises that commercialize their creativity,
increasingly confront conflicts that would be avoidable with better access to
information about the ownership and scope of the rights. The Patent Office
could perform its duties more effectively if applicants provided fuller and more
forthright disclosure and bore the social costs of seeking patent protection.
Those who wish to build on the works of others—such as documentary film-
makers and mashups artists—are hampered by the incompleteness of the copy-
right registry. Businesses seeking to market their products cannot definitively
determine the trademark landscape from Trademark Office records. The result
is that nearly all innovative and creative enterprises face a high cost of deter-
mining the intangible neighborhood surrounding their projects.
This article has highlighted structural causes of notice externalities plaguing
intangible resource development. The emergence of intellectual resources has
brought to light a fundamental market failure affecting the development of all
resources. Notice externalities result when resource claimants lack appropriate
incentives to provide adequate accessible information about their claim. The
difficulty of learning the contours of rights affecting resource development under-
mines progress. Due to the inherent characteristics of land and many other tan-
gible resources as well as technology for definitively identifying their boundaries,
publicly accessible ownership registries, and institutions for resolving disputes,
notice externalities do not manifest in many tangible resource contexts. As a
result, the general phenomenon of notice externalities has not attracted attention.
Intangible resources are inherently more difficult to describe and identify.
The available registries are incomplete and difficult to navigate. There are no
well-functioning institutions for determining freedom to operate. Intellectual
property rights and remedies further complicate the notice challenge. As a
result, the intellectual property systems encourage parties to hide, obfuscate,
and distort notice information. In the patent field, this has produced a vicious
cycle, whereby all manner of enterprises hoard patents for defensive and offen-
sive purposes, further obfuscating the patent landscape and sowing the seeds for
future opportunism. The development of expressive works and trademarks also
face serious problems as a result of unclear boundaries and ownership.
Although the courts have begun to rein in some of the most egregious
abuses, we believe that there are good reasons to conduct a broad sweep of
the intellectual property system to combat notice externalities.






























The problems of notice failure and notice externalities should be addressed at
three levels: direct provision of notice information, internalization of notice
externalities, and rules for reducing the harm from notice failure. Advances in
digital technology—which brought the problem of notice externalities to
light—also provide tremendous potential for reducing the range of notice fail-
ure problems.
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